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ARE COLLEGE PRESIDENTS LIKE FOOTBALL
COACHES? EVIDENCE FROM THEIR
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS
Randall S. Thomas* & R. Lawrence Van Horn**

College presidents and football coaches are frequently criticized for their high
compensation. In this paper, we argue that these criticisms are unmerited, as the
markets for both college presidents and football coaches exhibit properties
consistent with a competitive labor market. Both parties' compensation varies in
sensible ways related to the size of the programs they manage, as well as their
potentialforvalue creation. Successful college presidents andfootball coaches can
greatly increase the value of their schools well beyond the amount they receive in
compensation. If these higher education executives' compensation is the result of a
competitive labor market, and they do not capture compensation in excess of the
incremental value they create, the overall welfare of their universities is increased.
To shed light on these issues, we engaged in a comprehensive examination and
comparison of college president and football coach compensation levels and
employment contracts across FBS Division I universities. We found a number of
noteworthy results. First, we see large differences in job tenure of these two groups:
university presidents stay in their jobs significantly longer than football coaches.
Second, we observe thatfootball coaches are paid significantly more and their pay
is rising at a much faster rate than college presidents. Third, larger schools pay
these top executives much more than their smaller counterparts, especially for
football coaches. Furthermore, Power Five conference schools pay their coaches
far more than the otherfootball conferences. Finally, we note significantdifferences
in the structure of the college presidents' employment contracts compared to
football coaches' contracts.
For each of these majorfindings, we provide a detailed analysis of why they exist
and how they can be explained by economic theory.

*
John S. Beasley, II, Professor of Law and Business, Vanderbilt Law School,
Vanderbilt University.
**
Associate Professor of Economics and Management, Owen Graduate School
of Business, Vanderbilt University. We would like to thank Jessica Day and Eric Shlifer for
their outstanding assistance in the collection and coding of the data for this project, and Eric
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INTRODUCTION
College presidents' and football coacheS 2 are normally the highest-paid
university executives. Given the current attention paid to rising college tuition, the
media frequently focuses on their compensation, often arguing it is inappropriately

1.

To simplify the terminology, we use "college president" to indicate the chief

executive officer of a college or university. We recognize that our study includes both colleges
and universities and that they may have a variety of different names for their chief executive
officer. Indeed, our home university refers to its chief executive officer as its Chancellor.

2.

We use the term "football coach" to refer to all of the college football head

coaches that are included in our sample of FBS Division I coaches. We refer to football

coaches as "he" because all of the coaches in our sample are male.
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high.3 Implicit in this claim is the belief that if a football coach or college president
is paid more, then college tuition must increase, and students foot the bill.4
This view ignores two important underlying principles in executive
compensation. First, the markets for both college presidents and football coaches are
competitive. In a competitive labor market, highly skilled personnel can command
compensation equivalent to the salaries of people in comparable positions. To attract
and retain top talent in higher education, institutions must offer competitive pay
packages. Failure to do so will result in losing talented executives to other schools
or to jobs in other sectors of the economy.
Second, top executives in higher education control the fortunes of their
programs and universities; they have the capacity to increase the value of their
organization as a whole. For example, a successful football coach can boost a
football program's win-loss record, which may result in significant revenues,
increased publicity, and a greater number of students interested in attending the
school.5 Similarly, top college presidents can create value that exceeds their total
pay by turning around a flagging school or raising the value of a successful one by
engaging in activities such as fundraising, grant solicitation, and development of
popular academic programs. In short, so long as these higher education executives'
compensation is the result of a competitive labor market, and they do not capture
compensation in excess of the incremental value they create, then the overall welfare
of their universities is increased.
To shed light on these issues, we examined and compared college
presidents' compensation levels and employment contracts with those of football
coaches at like schools. In particular, we collected data for almost all public Football
Bowl Subdivision ("FBS") Division I collegeS 6 around the country, examining the
compensation and written employment agreements of both their football coaches
and their presidents. We found a number of noteworthy results that illuminate the
factors affecting the executives' compensation, and how these factors align with the
executives' capacity to create organizational value. First, we observed a large
difference in job tenure between presidents and football coaches, which has
significant implications for contracting processes and practices. We calculate that
university presidents have substantially longer job tenure than football coaches:
college presidents' average job tenure is about 7.6 years (median 6.0 years), whereas
3.
College President's Salaries, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Feb. 03, 2010),
http://www.chronicle.com/article/College-Presidents-Salaries/63874 (interviewing highereducation leaders and observers about their thoughts on this issue).
4.

See, e.g., LZ Granderson, Pay Coaches Less and Lower Tuition, ESPN (Nov.

18, 2011), http://www.espn.com/espn/commentary/story/j/id/7252031/ (suggesting that high
college coach compensation has resulted in high tuition).
5.

See e.g., Monte Burke, College Coaches Deserve TheirPay, WALL ST. J., Aug.

31, 2015, at A13 (referencing comments made by Mr. Witt, Alabama's president, regarding
how much Coach Nick Saban has helped fundraising efforts at Alabama).
6.
The NCAA is divided into three divisions, based roughly on school size;
Division I is comprised of the largest schools. The FBS of Division I consists of the 128
schools that play varsity football and which are allowed to provide scholarship aid (including
full scholarships) to a total of 85 players. College Athletic ScholarshipLimits, SCHOLARSHIP
STATS, http://www.scholarshipstats.com/ncaalimits.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2016).
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football coaches turn over on average every 4.6 years (median 3.0 years). One result
of this large difference is that football coaches enter into significantly more
employment contracts over our sample time period than college presidents.
This disparity reflects the underlying differences in the roles of the
respective parties and the criteria for their performance evaluations. Because clear
measures of success are directly attributable to the football coach, and because his
success has significant financial implications for the university, the coach's job
tenure should reflect his ability to create value. Keeping a coach with poor
performance is costly. On the other hand, although there exist several objective
measures for college president performance, some others are less clear and there is
less direct connection between a president's actions and their university's overall
performance. This makes it more difficult to identify and discharge poor performers.
Second, we see strong trends in compensation levels and their components
in our sample period. Beginning with college presidents' total compensation, we see
that during 2010-2014, five years for which we have comprehensive data, these
executives' average total compensation grew from $416,343 to $463,018, or about
10%, most of which was in the form of increases in base salary. By way of
comparison, if we look at the five-year 2009-2013 timeframe for football coaches,
for which we have complete data, we see average fixed pay increasing from
$1,138,285 to $1,570,823-approximately 38% overall. Thus we see football coach
pay increasing not only much faster than college president pay but also starting at a
higher average level. These pay increases are particularly noticeable at schools in
the five major football conferences (SEC, Big Ten, Pac-12, Big 12 and ACC) ("the
Power Five Conferences").
This is likely due to the large increase in television and bowl revenues
attributable to college football at these schools. For example, in the 2014-2015 fiscal
year, the Southeastern Conference ("SEC") generated $112 million from bowl
games and an additional $347 million in TV deals.7 Each school in the SEC took
home approximately $34 million of which $8 million was attributable to bowl
games.8 The SEC has projected that, when its TV contract with ESPN is renegotiated
9
in 2017-2018, each SEC school will receive in excess of $44 million annually.
While the SEC is the most highly valued conference, each team that is a member of
the Power Five Conferences received in excess of $20 million from 2014 to 2015.10

7.
Jason Alsher, 5 College Conferences That Bring in Over $250 Million,
CHEATSHEET (July 8, 2016), http://www.cheatsheet.com/sports/the-5-most-valuableconferences-in-college-sports.html/?a=viewall. This does not include $12 million for
basketball. Andy Staples, The Future of College Sports Media Rights, CAMPUS RUSH (Mar.
28, 2016), http://www.campusrush.com/college-sports-media-rights-deals-punt-pass-pork1692890873.html (stating that CBS pays $12 million annually to broadcast BIG Ten
basketball).
Alsher, supra note 7.
8.
9.
Chris Smith, The SEC is Finally the Most Valuable Conference in College
Sports,
FORBES
(July
20,
2015,
11:53
AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/chrissmith/2015/07/20/the-sec-is-finally-the-most-valuableconference-in-college-sports/2/.
Id.
10.
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Given the lucrative nature of college football for these schools, average coach
salaries seem more reasonable.
Comparing total compensation levels among the members of both groups
of top executives reveals significant disparities. By examining the pay differential
for college presidents across different size institutions we found that, in 2013, the
smallest quartile of universities paid their presidents an average of $386,573 in total
pay, whereas the largest quartile of schools paid their chief executive officers on
average $576,734, or almost 49% more than the smallest schools." Similar, but
more marked, differences exist for football coaches. For example, in 2013, football
coaches at the smallest quartile of FBS Division I schools earned total fixed pay of
$412,832, whereas coaches at the largest schools made total fixed compensation of
$2,664,955, or about 545% more on average than their counterparts at smaller
schools.
There are likely two factors at play here. First, for college presidents, those
at larger universities have a larger alumni base and thereby greater capacity to create
value for the university through fundraising. 1 2 Second, with greater size comes
greater job complexity and greater job responsibilities. This suggests the need for
more highly qualified personnel who command a higher labor-market premium.1 3
For coaches, the size effect associated with college football programs is largely due
to membership in one of the Power Five conferences where, as noted above, revenue
from TV and bowl appearances is significantly higher than at other schools and
conferences. 14 In sum, greater value creation by coaches at the larger schools leads
to greater compensation.
We also generated school-by-school comparisons to see if there are intraschool variations that would help us understand the differences between college
president pay and football coach compensation. We found that football coaches at
the Power Five Conference programs are paid far more than coaches at the other
FBS Division I schools (around four times more) and far more than all college
presidents (about six and a half times more).15 By comparison, there is little
difference in the total compensation paid to college presidents at the power football
conferences and the college presidents at other schools in our sample. Furthermore,
football coaches at non-power-conference schools are only paid around one and a
half times what their home school's president is paid. 1 6 Again, the most obvious
explanation for these trends is the impact of increased television and bowl revenues
for college football.
When we compared perquisite compensation forms and levels, we found
some further interesting differences. For college presidents, we found that while

11.

See infra Section JJJ.B.2.

12.

See ROBERT H. ATWELL & JANE V. WELLMAN, PRESIDENTIAL COMPENSATION
IN HIGHER EDUCATION: POLICIES AND BEST PRACTICES 12-13 (2000).

13.
See Rajiv D. Banker et al., The Compensation of University Presidents: A
Principal-Agent Theory and Empirical Evidence 14-15 (AAA 2010 Mgmt. Accounting
Section (MAS) Meeting Paper, Aug. 6, 2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1444849.
14.
Smith, supra note 9.
15.
See infra Section JJJ.B.3.

16.

Id.
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home institutions provide a majority with country club memberships, a lower, but
still significant, percentage are given a college-owned house to live in, as well as a
car or car allowance.1 7 The number of university presidents receiving these
perquisites has been stable or slightly declining over the past twenty years." By
contrast, the use of perquisites for football coaches has increased sharply in recent
years.1 9 Although football coaches are not generally provided with a house by the
university, they are commonly given a car or car allowance, a country club
membership, and, in a small but growing percentage of cases, the use of a collegeowned plane for personal travel. 2 0
Furthermore, the analysis demonstrates that institutions offer perquisites
that tend to correspond to resources that will facilitate the executives performing
their jobs. A university president spends a significant amount of time entertaining
potential donors, and, as such, a country club membership or university house
facilitates his or her ability to do so. By contrast, a college football coach spends a
high percentage of his time recruiting new players and is frequently on the road
visiting recruits. Resources, such as a car or plane, which reduce these costs, can
make the coach more effective and successful in his job.
Next, we turned to the legal terms of the two types of executive
employment contracts to see if there are fundamental differences between college
president employment contracts and those negotiated by football coaches. Overall,
college presidents' employment contracts are much more general in their terms than
football coach contracts. 2 1 For example, football coach employment contracts are
much more likely to include a fixed term of years than college presidents'
contracts. 2 2 In the instances where a college president's contract includes a fixed
term, the length of the term included in a football coach contract is likely to be
significantly longer. 23 College presidents' contracts have fewer defined terms that
4
constitute grounds for for-cause termination if they engage in serious misconduct. 2
In considering the legal protections of the contracts, we found that while universities
have, over time, sought greater rights to terminate both groups of employees,
football coach contracts have developed much stronger employer rights than college
president contracts. 25 This again may be attributed to the short tenure and disparities
in evaluating the two positions. Finally, our analysis shows that college football
coaches receive greater severance payments than college presidents if they are
terminated without cause. Given the relatively short job tenure of football coaches,
it is not surprising that they bargain for greater protection for their position in these
circumstances. 2 6 Ultimately, the findings of the research all provide insight that

17.

See infra Section IJ.B.4.

18.
19.
20.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See infra Section III.C.

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

See infra Table 6 (demonstrating detailed data on this comparison).
Id.
See infra Section III.D.
Id.
We also found that neither set of contracts used arbitration or noncompete

clauses often. See id.
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college executive pay follows the underlying principles of executive compensation.
The contracts demonstrate terms of a competitive labor market and a reflection of
the incremental value the executives add to the organization.
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, we provide an overview of the
implications of economic theory for college presidents and football coaches'
compensation and contracting provisions. Part II contains an overview of the
recruiting, hiring, and negotiation processes for college presidents' as well as a
discussion about how such processes differ from those used by universities for
football coaches. Part III contains our comparative empirical analysis of college
presidents' and football coaches' employment contracts and compensation. In Part
III's analysis, we present the detailed comparisons of compensation levels and
forms, as well as the legal language of the underlying employment contracts. We
finish with brief concluding remarks.

I. ECONOMIC THEORY, INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES, AND COLLEGE
PRESIDENTS' CONTRACTS
The structure of an organization, the nature of its employment contracts
with its employees, and the level of compensation the organization pays its
employees have all been the subject of organizational, economic, and principalagent theorists for many years, dating back to the seminal work of Michael Jensen
and William Meckling. 2 7 Adopting the theoretical approach of this literature affords
us the ability to predict and explain the types of contracts and compensation that
appear in any employment setting. In the case of college presidents, the president's
role in the university, along with certain institutional characteristics of universities,
helps us make strong predictions around what is likely to be a stable and efficient
form of employment.
To begin with, college presidents are both similar to and different from
CEOs. Presidents serve as the public face of the university. Their primary role is to
chart an aspirational vision for the future of the institution that will engage future
students and past alumni. 28 They reflect both the academic and cultural priorities of
the institution. Like corporate CEOs, they are accountable to a board, called the
board of trustees. However, while corporate CEOs are evaluated based upon simple,
observable measures that reflect the profit-making objectives of the organization and
financial returns to shareholders, the goals for a university president are broader and
less clear. The business of higher education has not been the preferred venue of forprofit commercial enterprises. 29 University presidents guide non-profit or public
27.

See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:

ManagerialBehavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcON. 305 (1976).
28.
See K. Johnson Bowles, The President'sMany Roles, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (July

1, 2013), https://www.insidehighered.com/advice/2013/07/01/many-roles-and-expectationscollege-presidents-essay.
29.
We acknowledge that this world is evolving, as evidenced by the likes of the
University of Phoenix and other for-profit universities. Their business models face a
significant backlash from the establishment and charges of profiteering at the expense of
individuals wishing to improve themselves. See, e.g., Sam Dillon, Troubles Grow for a
University
Built
on
Profits,
N.Y.
TIMvEs
(Feb.
11,
2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/11/education/I1phoenix.html; see also Emily Hanford,
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organizations, both of which lack a profit motive as the guiding force for their
existence. The lack of a profit motive makes it more difficult to evaluate the purpose
or effectiveness of college presidents' actions.
Higher education has conceptually occupied a different position in society
than that of the firm, one in which commercial motives are eschewed and loftier
goals are pursued. Measuring success of a for-profit CEO is straightforwardshareholder return-but a college president must be evaluated relative to the
sometimes ill-defined objectives of a non-profit organization. This lack of clear
objectives can afford presidents great discretion in how they run their universities.
Higher education is particularly challenging as it also pursues a social objective:
education.
In pursuit of these multiple objectives, university presidents are frequently
constrained by both the idiosyncratic preferences of the board, as well as other
pragmatic limitations to pursuing the board's intent. For instance, a common
practice dating back centuries allows the faculty within a university to have a role
in university governance, and, by dint of the tenure process, the faculty cannot be
removed by the president without cause. 30 Therefore, under this practice, the ability
of a university president to change the culture, operations, and execution of the
faculty, consistent with the objectives of the board, is limited.
More generally, university presidents are often limited by highly
politicized environments, balancing often-competing constituencies. These include
not only the preferences of the board of trustees or the state legislature, but also the
preferences of the faculty, current students, and the alumni-who can be a key
source of financial support. Taken collectively in a normative sense, it is not clear
whose goals university presidents should maximize and, therefore, what objectives
their employment contracts should incentivize.3 1 In other words, it is not evident
whose preferences should dominate among the competing stakeholders: board
members, state legislatures, faculty, or students. As a result, it is likewise unclear
what provisions the contract for a president should include if the goal is to
incentivize the president to maximize the value of the organization. For our
purposes, college presidents' struggles with different goals make the analysis of
their actual employment contracts revealing from a theoretical perspective.

The CaseAgainst For-ProfitColleges and Universities, AM. PUB. MEDIA: AM. RADIO WORKS,
http://americanradioworks.publicradio.org/features/tomorrows-college/phoenix/case-

against-for-profit-schools.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2016).
30.
Judith Areen, Government as Educator: A New Understanding of First
Amendment Protection of Academic Freedom and Governance, 97 GEO. L.J. 945, 959-60

(2009).
31.
CTR. FOR POLICY ANALYSIS, AMERICAN COUNCIL ON EDUCATION, THE
AMERICAN COLLEGE PRESIDENT 2012, at 33-37 (2012) [hereinafter CENTER FOR POLICY]

(detailing the most important constituencies for college presidents in terms of their time
allocation, and finding that legislators, faculty, and governing boards were the most
demanding).
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As non-profits, universities have a decidedly different objective and
governance structures than investor-owned firms.3 2 In the case of a non-profit firm,
the objective is to pursue some goals that balance financial performance with nonfinancial social objectives. The most common form of commercial non-profit
organizations are hospitals and universities.3 3
Under a non-profit charter, an organization is subject to the so-called "nondistribution constraint," which precludes the distribution of financial surplus to
shareholders.3 4 To the extent that a non-profit organization generates a surplus from
operations (that is, its revenues are in excess of the costs of providing the service),
the president is in a position to determine the disposition of these rents. Because the
non-distribution constraint requires the executives and the board to consume any
available surplus within the organization,3 5 the constraint can create tension between
the president and the board of a non-profit. Depending on the nature of the
employment arrangement and the assignment of decision-making rights, college
presidents will have significant latitude on how to pursue objectives that are
nonpecuniary and consistent with their preferences, yet, which may be at odds with
the preferences of the board of the organization. An employment contract can be a
way of addressing this potential conflict.
Many universities are also public organizations. These universities, while
sharing some characteristics with private non-profit universities, are the
beneficiaries of state-appropriated funds and, as such, have an objective that is
determined in part by their state legislatures. Public universities rely on in-state
tuition, out-of-state tuition, and government-appropriated funds to pursue their
operations, though they vary widely in their dependence on state funding for
operations. Irrespective of the level of funding, a public university president has the
additional challenge of being accountable not only to a board, but to a board that is
appointed by elected officials, who likely reflect the modal preferences of the state's
at-large population.
It is reasonable to assume that there exists some objective function, a
combination of the preferences of the state legislature, the faculty, the alumni, and
the student population, which the president "should" pursue. Given the differences
among the stakeholders, however, it is likely that this is a complex function that
lacks specificity. The principal-agent theory ascribes a behavioral model that is
relevant in this setting.3 6 In short, this theory states that the principal, here the board,
should contract with an agent, here the college president, to pursue the objectives of
the organization.3 7 If the president's preferences are entirely consistent with those
32.

See generally Henry B. Hansmann, The Role ofNonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE

L.J. 835 (1980).
33.
Id. at 835.
34.
Id. at 873-74 (discussing how a non-profit organization is legally precluded
from distributing financial returns to a controlling party; it is viewed as an issue of private
inurement, or as an excess benefit transaction, and is a criminal offense).
Id.
35.
36.
Jensen & Meckling, supranote 27, at 308.
37.
PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, EcoNoMIcs, ORGANIZATION AND
MANAGEMENT 126-27 (1992) (discussing how parties use compacts to recognize mutual
interests and "agree to modify their behavior in ways that are mutually beneficial").
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of the board, the contract is simple. Given the preceding discussion, however, it is
highly unlikely that any college president will have preferences that exactly match
those of all of the constituencies that are involved with a public university. To the
extent there is a divergence in these preferences, the existence and form of the
contract becomes even more important as a mechanism of addressing it.
A complete contract can provide the necessary clarity and direction for a
university president. The goal of a complete contract is to specify the actions of the
president under all alternative states of the world in order to incentivize both the
effort level and decisions that are consistent with the preferences of the
organization.3 8 This is facilitated by a number of key factors, including clearer
objectives and measurable output. If it were possible to contract with the president
regarding only the performance of the university, the contract would be simple and
specific. But it is costly to write a complete contract in the presence of uncertaintyboth in terms of states of the world as well as ambiguity around intent and
objectives.3 9 There is a tradeoff between the costs and benefits of writing a complete
contract. For example, most individuals are risk averse, desiring certainty over risk
ceteris paribus. These individuals require a risk premium to compensate them for
uncertainty.4 0 Given the uncertainty around objectives, outcomes, and the
contractibility around effort in the case of public university presidents, written
formal contracts may not exist or may be very difficult to draft.
Contracts are also an effective sorting mechanism. If it is possible to write
a contract with performance rewards for employment a priori, then only those
individuals who will excel under the contract will choose to seek employment. This
feature encourages individuals to sort and reveal private information about their
human capital and value-creating capacity around the terms of the contract.4 1 Hence,
if it is possible to write a contract that is complete, aligned with the objectives of the
firm, and predicated on realized performance whereby candidates reveal their human
capital, then efficiency will be enhanced. 4 2 Individuals will sort based on their
capacity to excel under the contract that maximizes their personal benefit.
Firms also look to the employment relationship to maximize their benefits.
They have differing needs based on their organizational models and types of
businesses. Organizations attract labor through a combination of job attributes,
compensation, and benefits. In well-functioning, competitive labor markets, the
level of compensation is determined by the market.4 3 Individuals are endowed with
different abilities to be productive and create value in firms. They must sort across
organizations and match with those firms whereby they can create the greatest value.
38.
Id. at 127; see, e.g., Bowles, supra note 28 (describing the many things that
can and do happen during a President's tenure including terrorist attacks, man-made and
natural catastrophes, and other difficult-to-predict events).
39.
MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 37, at 130 (discussing how difficult it is to
factor improbable contingencies without comparative experiences, and how high the
opportunity costs are to spend time calculating such contingencies).
40.
Id. at 187-88.
41.
Id. at 330 (stating that complete contracting is impossible).

42.
43.

(6th ed. 2005).

See id. at 341.
See ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L.

RUBINFIELD, MICROECONOMIcs 516-18
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Firms and employees exist in an equilibrium; no firm can pay an employee more
than the incremental value that the employee creates by joining the organization. 4 4
As such, barring market inefficiency, the observed compensation of the university
president or football coach should reflect their partial capture of the value they
create. 45 In cases where the institutional value created is large, readily observable or
quantifiable, largely the result of the individual's efforts, and general in nature (such
that the individual could generate similar performance in another institution), then
we would expect the individual in question to receive higher compensation. 4 6
Not all investments will lead to an increase in market value. An individual
brings to the firm their own knowledge and experience. 47 They apply these skills
within the context of the organization to create value for the firm. If success requires
significant knowledge of the internal workings of the firm, they will have to make
an investment and incur costs to generate value. This is referred to as firm-specific
human capital. 48 By definition, this knowledge is specific to the firm and the
particular employment relationship, and it is not valuable outside of the current
employment. Because labor markets determine compensation, and firm-specific
human capital is not valuable outside the current job, the market value of the
individual will not increase through such investments, as they are not portable to
another firm.49
Given this theoretical background, we generated a number of expectations
for our research. As we have discussed in prior work, college football coaches'
human capital embodies the characteristics of being general in nature and largely a
function of their efforts. 0 The performance of the football program is summarized
by their win-loss record. The head coach has a significant impact on that
performance,5 1 and successful coaches can readily change colleges and transfer their

44.

Id.

45.
Some commentators have argued that markets for corporate executives are
malfunctioning because in the corporate setting, the board of directors, which sets executive
pay levels, may have been unduly influenced by the executives themselves. See generally
LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE

&

OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004). Similar types of claims could be made about the board
of trustees, which sets top executive officer pay at universities. But see Mitchell Langbert
Marc Fox, The Compensation and Benefits of Private University Presidents 9 J. ACAD.
ADMIN. HIGHER EDUC. 45, 49 (2013) (finding no evidence that "private college presidents are

able to extract rents through their ties to boards of trustees").
46.
GARY BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS,
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO EDUCATION 29-54 (3rd ed. 1993).

47.

MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 37, at 328.
Id.
48.
Id.
49.
50.
Randall S. Thomas & Larry Van Horn, College FootballCoaches' Pay and
Contracts:Are They Overpaidand Unduly Privileged?, 91 IND. L.J. 189, 196 (2016).
51.
E.g., Mark Inabinett, Nick Saban by the Numbers: Alabama's Coach at No. 1
After
20
Seasons,
AL.COM
(Jan.
15,
2016,
8:18
PM),

http://www.al.com/sports/index.ssf/2016/01/nick-saban-by-the-numbersalab.html
that Coach Nick Saban has had success with two different college programs).

(stating
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skills to other settings.5 2 At the same time, overall football revenues from television
contracts and bowl games have become significant and more lucrative over time.
Taken collectively, these factors imply that the total compensation for football
coaches should be increasing, and their employment contracts should each include
a significant pay-for-performance component in terms of both compensation and job
retention. Football coach contracts exhibit these features. 5 3
Contrast the football coaches' task environment with that of college
presidents. Universities do not have a win-loss record. While fundraising,
graduation rates, rankings, and new program growth all reflect on the institution and
are to some extent factored into performance evaluations that boards of trustees
periodically provide to college presidents, 54 they do not fit together nicely into a
single definition of successful performance. Further, the primary engine of the
university's academic mission is its faculty. The ability of the president to
fundamentally change or affect the faculty is limited structurally through faculty
governance and tenure.5 5 Finally, the preferences of alumni and other key
stakeholders impact the definition of success. Although, the college president may
influence these preferences, they are likely exogenous factors that are relatively
fixed. Finally, it may be difficult to determine how much the efforts of the college
president contribute to the accomplishment of the university's goals.
Given that the definition of success is unclear, the ability of the president
to affect success is diffuse. Further, given that the university president embodies
institution-specific knowledge and experience that limits marketability, we expected
that university presidents would have lower compensation and lower pay growth
over time when compared to football coach compensation. 5 6 In other words, the
outside employment options for a university president are much fewer than for a
college football coach, given that a presidency frequently requires significant nontransferable investments in the university. In addition, considering the complex
nature of university governance, the relationship between the president and the
performance of the university is attenuated. It is difficult for any prospective
university to establish the marginal contribution of a presidential candidate to the
performance of the institution and, as a result, it is more difficult to support a high
valuation of their contribution.

52.
See,
e.g.,
Urban
Meyer,
OHIO
ST.,
http://www.ohiostatebuckeyes.com/sports/m-footbl/mtt/meyerjurban00.html
(last visited
Nov. 13, 2016) (stating that the Buckeyes are Meyer's fourth team).
53.
See Thomas & Van Hom, supra note 50, at 216-20.
54.
See, e.g., Amendment to Letter of Appointment Between the Bd. of
Supervisors of the Univ. La Sys. and James Cofer, President Univ. of La. at Monroe (Aug.
29, 2008) (on file with author).
55.
See Areen, supra note 30.
56.
Save a few notable examples of college presidents who have successfully held
the post at multiple institutions. See, e.g., Linda Harris, WVU PresidentE. Gordon Gee Has
Been
Giddy
to
Return,
ST.
J.
(July
26,
2014,
5:00
AM)
http://www.statejoumal.com/story/26105216/full-circle-wvu-president-e-gordon-gee-hasbeen-giddy-to-retum-to-the-post-that-launched-his-career
(stating that Gee had been
president of West Virginia University, the University of Colorado, and Ohio State
University).
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We further expected college presidents to have less-complete contracts and
a greater percentage of at-will employment relationships. University presidents lack
a clear win-loss metric for success. Depending on the objective of the university and
the perspectives of the board, university success may include growth, reputational
enhancement, and improvement in national rankings, grant funding, faculty
recruitment, financial performance, fundraising, and athletic performance. The
relative weights that might be placed on these measures are not clear and are likely
to vary from university to university. In addition, the potential for the president to
affect many of these metrics in the short term is limited. In total, a contract that
clearly quantifies metrics for success is difficult to write, given the likely differing
views amongst the stakeholders. As such, it is more common for the board to
qualitatively evaluate the performance of the president based on the members'
collective opinion. This affords the board flexibility in evaluating the president and
allows them to consider dimensions that do not lend themselves to direct
measurement.
These four factors also have implications for contract terms regarding
termination. For football coaches, given the direct relationship between on-field
performance and the skills of the coach, losing is costly. It not only markedly
increases the chance of termination, but also reduces the likelihood of future
employment as a head coach. To compensate for this risk, college football coach
contracts often include significant severance payment provisions.5 7
The situation is much the opposite in the case of university presidents. The
inability to fully define what constitutes poor performance, coupled with a relatively
tenuous relationship between the president's effort and the school's performance,
militates against imposing a significant reputational cost for termination. They also
have, in most cases, a fallback faculty position if they leave the presidency, as it is
common for the president to return to the faculty upon completion of a term
appointment." Accordingly, we would expect severance payment provisions to be
much less common in the case of college presidents.

II. COLLEGE PRESIDENTS: RECRUITING, HIRING, AND
NEGOTIATION OF EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS
In recent years, the process of locating and hiring a new college president
has become increasingly formalized.5 9 In this section, we give a broad overview of
57.
See Will Hobson & Steven Rich, College Sports' Fastest-Rising Expense:
Paying
Coaches
Not
to
Work,
WASH.
POST
(Dec.
13,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/colleges/college-sports-fastest-rising-expense-

paying-coaches-not-to-work/2015/12/10/ec856b42-9d33-1 1e5-bce4708fe33e3288_story.html.
58.
CHARLES B. NEFF & BARBARA LEONDAR, PRESIDENTIAL SEARCH: A GUIDE TO
THE PROCESS OF SELECTING AND APPOINTING COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY PRESIDENTS 79

(1992).
59.
The search process has been documented in a series of influential books
published by the Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges (the "AGB"),
which are updated every few years to reflect changes in the marketplace and to reflect
evolving best practices. Some recent examples include NEFF & LEONDAR, supra note 58 and
JOSEPH S. JOHNSTON, JR. & JAMES P. FERRARE, A COMPLETE GUIDE TO PRESIDENTIAL SEARCH
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the different stages in recruiting, hiring, and negotiating the contract for new college
presidents, highlighting the most important issues along the way. We then compare
it to the process used for football coaches and note the important differences.
A. Creating the Search Committee to Hire a New College President
The board of trustees ("the Board") sits at the top of the organizational
hierarchy at major colleges and universities.6 0 The Board, often consisting of
influential alumni that have made major financial contributions to the school,6 1 is
therefore vested with the ultimate decision of whom to select when an incumbent
president steps down and a new president must be appointed.6 2 While the Board has
final control over the selection of the president, there are a number of other important
constituencies that will expect to be part of the process and, in most circumstances,
will be included as part of the process to ensure organizational harmony. It is
therefore common for the Board to set up a search committee (the "Search
Committee") and to include amongst its members representatives of the faculty,
students, alumni, administrators, as well as a few trustees. The goal is for all of the
important players to buy into the process and to support the successful candidate
once the selection is made. While the size of the committee varies, usually it contains
between nine and fifteen members, which is enough to allow for a wide spectrum of
views without creating too large a group to be efficient.6 3
The Board gives a clear charge to the Search Committee about its mandate.
For example, the Board is likely to instruct the Search Committee about the
appropriate number of finalist candidates to recommend to the Board at the end of
the process.' Typically, the Board will ask for three to five highly qualified finalists
so that it can make a choice among them.6 5 The Search Committee generally will
follow these instructions. Providing only one name to the Board effectively deprives
the Board of making its choice in the matter.6 6
Next, the Board and Search Committee define what they consider to be the
necessary qualities of the appointee. 6 7 College presidents perform many different
FOR UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES (2013). We draw on these volumes frequently in this section

to provide background factual information about the college president search process.
60.
See JOHNSTON & FERRARE, supra note 59, at 1-2 (stating that boards
"establish[] the [university's] mission and approv[e] its strategic plan, ensuring fiscal integrity
and academic quality, and preserving institutional autonomy and academic freedom").
61.

See,

e.g.,

University

of

Michigan Board of

Regents,

REGENTS,

http://www.regents.umich.edu/about/bios/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2016) (linking to biography
pages of the eight members of the Board of Regents, seven of which are alumni).
62.
JOHNSTON & FERRARE, supranote 59, at 1 (explaining that in American higher
education, the legal responsibility to select a president is borne solely by the Board).
63.
NEFF & LEONDAR, supra note 58, at 3-5.
64.
Id. at 9.
65.
Id. at 59.
66.
Id. at 73-75. When only one president is recommended by the committee, the
Board must ratify or reject the recommendation. If it rejects the recommendation, the Board
must request more recommendations or create a new committee. This can be avoided if the
Board charges the Search Committee to recommend two to three candidates. Id.
67.
See Timothy L. Channell, PresidentialSuccession Planningfor Governing
Boards in Higher Education 35-36, MARSHALL DIGITAL SCHOLAR: THESES, DISSERTATIONS
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functions, each of which may require different skill sets. 68 A small, underfunded
college may need someone whose specialty is fundraising, whereas a large, complex
university may need a president that has more substantial administrative experience.
Carefully defining the desired skill set makes the Search Committee's job more
successful. 69
A third important issue relates to the responsibilities of the Search
Committee.7 0 Generally, the Search Committee will be charged with generating a
pool of potential candidates, creating dossiers on each of them, and then screening
them to determine the most qualified.7 1 The searching and screening functions can
be performed by one committee, although sometimes two committees are set up,
and the two functions are split between them.7 2
A closely related issue is whether to employ an outside search consultant,
such as an executive search firm, to assist the Search Committee in assembling and
screening a pool of potential candidates. Increasingly, such consultants are hired to
help the Search Committee.7 3 While their services can be very valuable, they are
costly: typically, they charge 30-33% of the first year's salary and benefits of the
appointee, or if they are a non-profit, they may charge a flat fee. 74 Outside
consultants may be particularly useful if the college is "in a crisis situation where
the institution has had two or more presidents in rapid succession, where the
departure of the previous president was stormy, or where feelings of distrust and
antagonism affect the attitudes of faculty, students, and trustees." 75
A final preliminary issue is whether the Board will appoint an interim
president immediately in order to give the search committee enough time to proceed
appropriately. This decision will depend on the particular circumstances
surrounding the departure of the former president: an unexpected dismissal or abrupt
resignation may surprise the Board and dictate the appointment of an interim
president. A failed initial search will also likely lead to the appointment of an interim
7 6
candidate to provide the Board time to restart the process.
B. Planning the Search and Creating a Pool of Candidates
One of the first things that the Board needs to do is to appoint a chair for
the Search Committee. In addition to running the committee internally, the chair will
CAPSTONEs
(Jan.
1,
2013),
http://mds.marshall.edu/cgilviewcontent.cgi?article=1469&context=etd (listing as leadership
skills "expanded self-awareness; an ability to clarify expectations, set directions, and chart a
course; a talent for developing others as leaders; credibility; influence; and motivation").
68.
See id. at 10-12.
&

69.
70.

See NEFF & LEONDAR, supra note 58, at 15-19.
See id. at 3.

71.

Id. at 33-41.

72.

Id. at 3-4.

73.
See CENTER FOR POLICY, supra note 31, at 45 ("Overall, 56 percent of 2011
presidents were recruited with the assistance of a search consultant.").
74.
NEFF & LEONDAR, supra note 58, at 10; see also Channell, supra note 67, at
27 ("[C]osts to institutions [for search firms run] into five and six figure dollar amounts.").
75.
NEFF & LEONDAR, supra note 58, at 11.
76.
See JOHNSTON & FERRARE, supra note 59, at 26.
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be the primary liaison between the school and the candidates. Having an
experienced, well-organized chair is critical to the success of the search.77 Once the
chair is in place, and the remainder of the Search Committee has been appointed,
the committee needs to create a search plan with a realistic timetable. Given the
broad nature of the Search Committee's work, a reasonable timeframe for the entire
process to be completed is usually four to six months.7 8
At this point, the Search Committee can begin its job. A crucial first step is
to ensure that the members of the committee are aware of the importance of
preserving confidentiality.7 9 There are some legal limitations that bear on this issue,
especially at state universities, and the Search Committee will need to comply with
them carefully to avoid confusion and mistakes. 0 The committee members must be
aware of the rules that apply to their search.
At this point, the Search Committee can begin a comprehensive search for
candidates.8 2 In the early stages, the committee will cast a wide net using a variety
of techniques to generate a list of potential candidates. A common method includes
announcing the vacancy to the appropriate media, such as the Chronicle of Higher
Education.83 The Search Committee may also decide to advertise the
commencement of the school's search process and invite outside applications.8 4 The
committee is likely to request that all of the various constituencies of the college
submit the names of possible candidates that they wish the committee to consider.8
This is one area where the committee may productively employ an executive search
firm to come up with lists of potential candidates.8 6
The best candidates may already be employed in high-level administrative
positions at other colleges or universities.8 7 These potential candidates are often
reluctant to apply for positions and may need to be courted by the Search Committee
privately so as to preserve the confidential nature of their interest. " Internal
candidates also raise confidentiality issues: if internal candidates are allowed to
77.
See NEFF & LEONDAR, supra note 58, at 21.
78.
See id. at 30.
See id. at 25-26.
79.
See id. at 25.
80.
81.
See JOHNSTON & FERRARE, supra note 59, at 57.
82.
Id. at 77.
83.
See, e.g., Presidential Openings, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.: VITAE,
https://chroniclevitae.com/job-search?job-search%5Bposition-type%5D=148
(last visited
Oct. 5, 2016) (listing presidential openings).
84.
JOHNSTON & FERRARE, supra note 59, at 79.

85.

Id. at 80-81.

86.
But see Milton Greenberg, You Don'tNeed a SearchFirm to Hire a President,
CHRON. HIGHER. EDUC. (Sept. 1, 2014), http://chronicle.com/article/You-Dont-Need-aSearch-Firm/148525/ (stating that the use of search firms to find potential presidents has
increased, but that there is no evidence that use of a search firm is beneficial).
87.
JOHNSTON & FERRARE, supra note 59, at 81.
88.
NEFF & LEONDAR, supranote 58, at 37; see, e.g., Dennis M. Barden, Inside a
Presidential
Search,
CHRON.
HIGHER
EDUC.
(June
16,
2014),
http://chronicle.com/article/Inside-a-Presidential-Search/147083/
(suggesting that some

sitting presidents would not have entered Marquette's presidential search if it were not
confidential).
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apply and the confidentiality of their application is compromised, the outside
candidates may infer that the search process has been structured to favor the insider's
candidacy.8 9 This may inhibit highly qualified outsiders from applying for the
position, especially if they are already employed at other institutions.9 0 Generally
speaking, about two-thirds of college presidents are external hires. 91
C. Interviewing Candidates and Developing the Finalists
The Search Committee will look at the candidate pool in its entirety in a
relatively short period of time. 9 2 This must be done systematically. One possible
schedule is to divide the review into phases. In phase one of the search process, the
Search Committee produces a large list (15-25) of potential candidates. In the
second phase, the Search Committee will promote 8-10 semifinalists to the final
phase, during which the 3-5 candidates that will be submitted to the Board are
selected. 93
In phase one, the Search Committee will need to read and rate the dossiers
of all of the candidates. If an executive search firm is employed, the Search
Committee can delegate some of the initial review and rating to them. This part of
the process is designed to assemble fairly complete files that include all relevant
public information about each candidate. There will be no reference checks
conducted nor interviews scheduled for candidates at this early stage in the process;
those will be delayed until the screening process reduces the list to the
semifinalists. 94
Phase two is designed to select a group of semifinalists who will be invited
to interview with the Search Committee. 9 5 Ideally, the interview team will be
comprised of the entire committee, although scheduling difficulties and
confidentiality may require the use of smaller subsets of the entire committee. At
these interviews, the individual members of the committee are generally assigned
topics on which to focus during the course of the interview. Interviews normally
address the leadership areas that were included in the search mandate and last two
to three hours. 96
The end goal of the phase two process is the generation of a list of three to
five finalists. After the completion of the interviews, the Search Committee, with
the approval of the finalists, will engage in reference checks. 97 These are commonly
done via phone by members of the Search Committee and cover an agreed set of
issues asked by designated questioners.9 8 An executive search firm may also be

89.
90.
91.

NEFF

& LEONDAR, supra note 58, at 3 8-39.

Id.

92.

CENTER FOR POLICY, supranote 31, at 41 fig.14.
See NEFF & LEONDAR, supra note 58, at 41.

93.

See id.

94.
95.

See id. at 42-44.
See id. at 51.

96.
97.
98.
26 (2007).

Id. at 55-57.
See id. at 59-60.
See JEAN A. DOWDALL, SEARCHING FOR HIGHER EDUCATION LEADERSHIP 125-
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tasked with conducting background checks on the finalists.99 Throughout this
process, the Search Committee must keep written records of all oral communications
and stay in touch with candidates. 00
Each finalist will need to visit the college campus to meet with the different
university stakeholder groups, including faculty, students, administrators, and
trustees. These visits generally last one-and-a-half to two days. 01 At this stage, the
Search Committee chair will need to discuss with each finalist candidate the general
terms of employment the university will offer. This usually includes the range of
total compensation that is contemplated in addition to any special terms unique to
the candidate. These discussions ensure that the candidate is aware of and accepts
the financial terms of the position prior to an offer being extended. At the end of
their visits, the Search Committee chair generally asks each candidate if he or she is
still interested in being selected for the position to make sure they are still seeking
102
the position.
D. Picking the President
Next, the Search Committee will send its list of finalists to the Board.1 0 3 As
noted earlier, the committee will normally provide the Board with a slate of potential
candidates, rather than a single candidate, so that the Search Committee does not
undermine the Board's ability to choose a preferred candidate.1" The Board will
review all of the information provided by the Search Committee as well as the
information it has gathered in making its decision. o At this point, time is short, and
the Board must move quickly before any of the candidates drop out of the pool.1 06
When it believes that it is ready to act, the decision is normally made by
the entire Board.107 The Board will need to negotiate the terms of appointment for
the president, including salary and pension; medical, health, and life insurance;
moving expenses; housing (including maintenance and repairs); entertainment
expenses; household help; and car and travel expenses.108 Many candidates will want
to be awarded tenured appointments, not only because they want to teach or receive
recognition of their academic achievements, but also in order to have a fallback
position if they decide to retire or are fired. 109

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

JOHNSTON & FERRARE, supra note 59, at 106-07.
See NEFF & LEONDAR, supra note 58, at 57-58.

104.
105.

See id. at 59.
See id. at 75.

106.
107.
108.

JOHNSTON & FERRARE, supra note 59, at
NEFF & LEONDAR, supra note 58, at 75.

109.

See id. at 79.

See id. at 62-65.
See id. at 68-71.
See id. at 71-73.

See id. at 76-77.

127-28.
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E. Negotiating the New President's Contract
In the not too distant past, a surprisingly high percentage of college
presidents did not have written employment contracts.1 10 Those who did have
written agreements had simple letter agreements from the chair of the Board."' But
as we demonstrate in Part III, this is no longer true. 1 1 2 Now, not only do almost all
college presidents have formal written employment contracts, but "they are
beginning to look more like a corporate contract might look." 11 3 What are new
presidents likely to see contained in their employment contracts? "The agreement
between the [B]oard and the new president should be recorded in a formal, written
document that systematically outlines, at a minimum, duties, terms of service, direct
and indirect compensation, arrangements for performance assessment, review of
compensation, and termination criteria."1 14
In recent years, more contracts are heavily negotiated, complex
documents."' The increased use of written employment contracts has increased the
complexity of those contracts and the use of outside counsel. 1 1 6 Board chairs
increasingly rely on outside advisors, such as search consultants, the university's
internal legal counsel, and even specialized attorneys that are experts in tax and the
negotiation of employment contracts. College presidents also talk to others, such as
attorneys and colleagues in the field, to get advice on negotiating strategy.11 7
Contract length and compensation levels are important negotiated terms.
Contract length is increasing, according to one source, which found that the most
common contract length in 2011 was three years." Compensation levels have also
increased.1 19
In terms of how compensation levels are set, "At most colleges, a
president's salary is set after consideration of five leading factors: the size and

110.
ATWELL & WELLMAN, supra note 12, at 35 ("Almost half of the institutions in
both [private and public] sectors report that they have no compensation or employment
contracts .... '); see NEFF & LEONDAR, supra note 58, at 82 ("What is really surprising is the
number of institutions where the agreement is entirely oral.").
111.
NEFF & LEONDAR, supra note 58, at 82.
112.
CENTER FOR POLICY, supranote 31, at 46 tbl.25 (showing a steadily increasing
percentage of college presidents have written employment contracts and that by 2011 about
76% had them).
113.

Janel Davis, $1 Million Salaries for College Presidents Spur Debate,

9, 2015, 1:57 PM), http://www.myajc.com/news/news/localeducation/1-million-salaries-for-college-presidents-spur-deb/nmXwG/ (quoting Professor
James Finkelstein).
114.
JOHNSTON & FERRARE, supra note 59, at 129.
115.
Id. at 130 ("[N]egotiations sometimes produce elaborate documents that detail
agreements about all aspects of the employment relationship.").
116.
See id. ("With the ascendance of written employment contracts, both
institutions and presidential finalists are more likely to seek advice from third parties.").
Id.
117.
118.
CENTER FOR POLICY, supra note 31, at 47. This is not consistent with our
findings based on more recent data. See infra Table 6 and the discussion of its findings in Part
III.
119.
See infra Table 2a and the discussion of our findings in Part III.
ATLANTA J.-CONST. (June
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complexity of the institution, overall years of experience and talents of the president,
performance in office (meeting goals and expectations), whether the school is
independent or state financed, and competitive market forces." 1 20 Externally
recruited presidents are paid more than internal candidates. 121
Virtually every institution seeks to pay competitive compensation levels
for their top executives, even as executive compensation has become a sensitive
topic in higher education. 12 2 Federal tax law, especially the IRS intermediate
sanction requirements, require boards of 501(c)(3) institutions to avoid paying
"excess benefits" in their salary and benefit payments to employees. However, these
rules are designed to address board policies and procedures for setting
compensation, rather than the compensation levels themselves. By following
appropriate procedures, boards can ensure that the IRS rules create a rebuttable
presumption that the salaries and benefits they pay are reasonable. In particular,
these rules require that a delegated committee comprised solely of disinterested
trustees makes compensation decisions, that compensation is benchmarked against
comparable institutions, and that compensation decisions follow board reviews of
1 23
presidential performance.
As a result of these rules, and as a matter of good practice, contract
provisions providing for periodic performance assessments need to be included in
the president's employment contract. 124 These usually "include both annual
evaluations and comprehensive reviews every four or five years. 1 2 5 In 2011, 87
percent of college presidents had "contracts that call[ed] for annual performance
evaluations conducted by boards or board subcommittees (60 percent), system heads
(20 percent), or board chairs (14 percent)." Similar data is not available concerning
the frequency of comprehensive multi-year performance reviews.126 We were
unable to obtain much information about these reviews for our study.
Benchmarking of compensation levels is also quite common. The
"intermediate sanction regulations strongly suggest a focus on peer institutions,
those that would generally be considered closely comparable in terms of control
(public or independent, for-profit or not), enrollment, endowment, and other such
variables." 12 7 At larger schools, compensation consultants are often hired to assist
the board in making the appropriate comparisons. These organizations can collect,
aggregate, and contextualize reliable data, and frequently maintain proprietary
12 8
databases for this purpose.
Today, more college presidents earn over $1 million more in salary than in
years past. 129 This may reflect increasing value created by college presidents over

120.

College PresidentsSalaries, supra note 3.

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Langbert & Fox, supranote 45.
See Davis, supra note 113.
JOHNSTON & FERRARE, supra note 59, at 134.
Id. at 132.
Id.
Id. at 132-33.
Id. at 135.
Id. at 135-36.
Davis, supra note 113.
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time or the greater level of competition to attract top talent. Benchmarking of
compensation levels explains some of this increase, as college presidents can
compare their pay packages with their counterparts at other institutions.13 0 In the
words of one commentator: "It's not unlike coaches who have a winning
season . . . . They keep close tabs on each other, and the salaries keep going up."131
F. Selecting Football Coaches13 2
FBS Division I universities need to find replacement football coaches, on
average, every 4.6 years.13 3 Given the financial significance of college football
programs at most of these schools, and the frequency with which they need to find
new coaches, the hiring process has become highly professionalized.1 3 4
The athletic director ("AD") of the university will, in conjunction with an
executive search firm, generate a list of potential candidates for the position.135 The
search process must move quickly to ensure that the school secures a coach after the
college bowl games are completed and before the athlete recruiting process for the
following year begins. 13 6 If the school is too slow, it risks losing an entire year of
potential recruits. 137
The search firm will act on behalf of the school to transmit preliminary
information about the position to prospective candidates, while also obtaining
publicly available information about each of the potential hires.1 3 8 Almost all
potential candidates are employed by another football program, either as head
139
coaches or as assistant coaches; rarely will a school hire an internal candidate.
Many coaches employ agents to act as their intermediaries in these early discussions
with search firms.14 0 The agent will negotiate many of the key points of a potential

130.
Id. ("[C]ollege presidents closely watch how much their colleagues make.").
Id.
131.
132.
For an in-depth discussion of all of the steps in the process of hiring a football
coach, see generally Thomas & Van Horn, supranote 50.
Id. at 215.
133.
134.

See generally id. at 204-09.

135.
136.
137.

Id. at 205-06.
Id. at 205.
Id.

138.

See Dana O'Neil, Need a Coach? There's a Firm for That, ESPN (Aug. 2,

2013),
http://espn.go.com/mens-college-basketball/story/_/id/9524814/search-firms-takelead-filling-head-coaching-vacancies-college-athletics.
One reason why internal candidates are rare is that assistant coaches' successes
139.
are very visible to other schools, and the hiring interval is very short for head coaches, so top
quality "heir apparents" often get snapped up by other schools. For example, James Franklin
was an assistant coach at the University of Maryland, where he had been anointed the likely
successor for the head coaching position. However, when Vanderbilt University needed to
hire a new head football coach, they succeeded in luring him away. See Jeff Barker,
Friedgen's Firing Was Weeks in the Making, BALTIMORE SUN (Dec. 21, 2010),
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2010-12-21/sports/bs-sp-terps-fridge-122120101220_1_lame-duck-atlantic-coast-conference-coach-football-coach.
140.
Thomas & Van Horn, supra note 50, at 206-07.
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employment contract, such as compensation levels, football program resources, staff
levels and pay. 141
Once the search firm has completed its initial process, the potential coach
hires will need to request permission from their own ADs in order to talk with
prospective employers. 14 2 By this point in the search, the search firm, in consultation
with the hiring school's AD, will have prepared a memorandum of understanding
("MOU") that embodies all of the basic economic terms of the proposed position:
salary, contract length, perquisites, bonus pay, service pay, termination benefits, and
contract buyout amounts. 1 43 A select group of prospective candidates will be
provided with this document and invited to initial interviews. 1 4
These initial interviews are held off-campus with the intention of
narrowing the pool of applicants to a small number of serious candidates, who will
be invited to come to the hiring school's campus for final interviews. 145 Both parties
will now have a very good idea of their relative levels of interest and the potential
fit of the candidate with the particular school. At the end of the initial interviews,
the school will conduct background checks in order to make its final decisions about
whom to invite back. 146
On-campus interviews are scheduled for three or four candidates, any one
of whom the university would be happy to hire as its new coach. These interviews
are designed to sell the school to the coach. The potential hire will meet with the
college president, key trustees, and important administrators. At the end of these
meetings, the university will have established its internal ranking of the
candidates. 1 47 The university will negotiate with each of the potential candidates
until they are confident that they can land their highest choice among those seriously
interested in the job. 1 48 The most difficult point of preliminary negotiations is the
amount of the buyout clause in the coach's contract. 149 Compensation issues
normally are resolved by benchmarking the contract against other coaches' contracts
at similar universities or within the school's conference.1 50 In order to avoid having
141.

Mark Schlabach, How Jimmy Sexton Became College Football's Ultimate

Power
Broker,
ESPN
(Dec.
1,
2015),
http://espn.go.com/collegefootball/story_/id/14239090/jimmy-sexton-college-football-power-broker-scenes.
142.
See Thomas & Van Hom, supra note 50, at 206 (mentioning that there is an
informal agreement amongst athletic directors to "not solicit one another's coaches without
prior permission"); see also O'Neil, supra note 138 (stating that one of the search firm's
duties is to contact coaches and their respective agents).
143.
Thomas & Van Hom, supra note 50, at 207.
Id.
144.
145.
Tom Dienhart, The Dynamics of a Coaching Search, RVALS.COM (Dec. 20,
2009), https://perma.cc/PX49-WHHJ ("If everything lines up correctly, a candidate is
interviewed by the school. Often, the interview will take place in an out-of-the-way location
to keep the process as far from the public eye as possible.").
146.
Thomas & Van Hom, supra note 50, at 208.
147.
Id. at 208-09.
148.
Id. at 209 ("[T]he school will continue to negotiate in secret with several
candidates simultaneously until they are confident that their preferred candidate will accept
the job.").
149.
Id. at 209.
150.

See generally id. at 207.
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to publicly admit that it did not get its first choice, the university will not make a job
offer to any candidate without being sure that the candidate will accept.15
After the coach accepts the position, his agent will negotiate some of the
remaining terms of the employment contract with the agent's counterpart at the
university or outside counsel for the university. Terms to finalize might include the
definition of "cause" in the termination provisions of the contract, or the form(s) of
incentive pay that the coach will be eligible to receive under certain circumstances.
Both sides have strong incentives to successfully conclude these negotiations. 15 2
G. Comparing College President and Football Coach Hiring Processes
Comparing the process of recruiting and selecting college presidents with
finding replacement football coaches, there are many similarities but also some clear
differences. Three key differences are that: (1) football coaches routinely use agents
to negotiate their contractual terms of employment, whereas college presidents do
not; (2) executive search firms are almost always used in football coach searches,
while in college president searches they are used less frequently (although they are
becoming more common); and (3) football coaches generally have buyout clauses
in their contracts that require them to pay the university if they leave voluntarily but
provide hefty severance payment provisions if the university terminates them
without cause, whereas college presidents normally do not have such clauses in their
employment contracts.153
The principal effect of these differences is that the football coach recruiting
process is more highly professionalized than the one currently in place for college
presidents. 15 4 Agents forcefully represent their clients' interests to ensure that their
compensation levels and contractual protections are benchmarked against the terms
of similarly placed coaches at other schools throughout the country. 1' Experienced
search firms specialize in football coach searches, speeding up the dissemination of
information and helping to move coaches from one school to another. 15 6 More
frequent turnover in the coaches' ranks leads schools to insist on compensation in
the event a coach leaves to take a better job. Coaches seek compensation in the
highly likely event that they are terminated without cause at some stage of their
career.1 57 With this as background, we turn next to a close comparison of these
executives' contracts.

III. COLLEGE PRESIDENT VS. FOOTBALL COACH CONTRACTS
College presidents, by definition, are the highest-ranking employees at
their institutions. A football coach, by comparison, reports to the university's AD,
who in turn reports to the college president. In most organizations, the president is
the highest-paid employee, and we might therefore expect that the college president

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 209.
See id. at 230.
Id. at 235-37.
Id. at 205-09.
Id. at 207.
See id. at 205-06.
Id. at 235-37.
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would be paid more and have better contractual protections in their employment
agreements than the football coach. Does this hold true at universities as well? To
address this question, we begin by discussing our data collection process, then move
on to compare the compensation levels and its forms for both types of university
employees and finish by examining the legal terms in both sets of contracts.
A. Data Collection and Comparison of the Samples
In our prior work, we generated a list of all the FBS Division I public
universities and obtained the employment contracts for their football coaches.' In
order to create a matching set of employment contracts for college presidents, we
sent Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") requests to each of these public
universities using their state law FOIA statutes. Private universities do not have to
make these disclosures under the state FOIA statutes so we were not able to obtain
those agreements.
We obtained most of the college president employment contracts from
1995 to 2013 from the schools that responded to our requests. In some cases
involving older contracts, schools had documentation retention policies that resulted
in the disposal of the relevant contracts, but we have virtually complete data for the
period of 2005 to 2013.159 As with our prior project, there were a few public schools
located in jurisdictions where state law does not require disclosure of these
documents, 1 6 0 and we were unable to obtain those contracts. A handful of other
public universities did not respond. 1 6 1
Although historically college presidents did not sign written agreements,
such formal employment contracts are on the rise; 1 6 2 we collected 596 such contracts
in our sample. Table 1A, below, provides an overview of the college president
contracts that are in our sample. We define employment contracts as the initial
agreement between the college and the employee that is assuming the role of top
executive at the school. 16 3 The college president's "first employment contract is
especially important, because it sets the base for future adjustments and defines the
expectations and process for review." 164 The second group of contracts constitutes
amendments to employment contracts. These are agreements that are entered into
after the initial employment agreement, usually after a significant period of time.
Generally, these amendments are adopted to change the compensation amounts paid

158.

See generally id.

159.
There are a few contracts which schools have not provided, such as Gordon
Gee's initial contract with Ohio State University.
Thomas & Van Horn, supra note 50, at 213 n.41.
160.
161.
Id. Some schools, such as Auburn and Clemson, had no records of contracts
with their respective presidents.
162.
NEFF & LEONDAR, supra note 58, at 82 ("[T]he use of contracts is on the
upswing in four-year institutions.").
163.
This means that we excluded agreements for positions below the president
where the employee was previously working for the college prior to being appointed as
president. In a few cases, the college expressly adopted a pre-existing contract as the new
president's contract, and in this event, we coded these contracts as employment contracts.
164.
ATWELL & WELLMAN, supra note 12, at 36.
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to the president, but they can also alter other terms of the contract. 165 Over the course
of their tenure, presidents may execute more than one amendment to their initial
employment agreement. There are 221 of these contracts in our sample.
A third form of agreement is an amended and restated employment
contract. Employers typically enter into these agreements with their top employees
after there have been several contract amendments or when they desire to make more
significant changes to their president's terms of employment. 1 6 6 At the time they
execute the amended or restated contracts, the parties have usually already made
several changes to the initial contract, and the parties want to incorporate all of the
previous changes, as well as additional changes, into a new contract that embodies
their complete understanding with the university. 1 67 We collected 134 of these
contracts in our sample.
Finally, we have a set of 44 interim president employment contracts.
Interim presidents are normally hired for a limited time to run the college in a
caretaker role while the college is searching for a new president. These contracts are
quite different from college president contracts because there is generally no
expectation that the interim president will be hired for an ongoing position as
president. 168 Instead, the interim presidents' job is just to manage the school's
business affairs for the time necessary for the search process to be completed and a
new president to step in on a full-time basis. 169 We do not include these contracts in
the remaining part of our analysis because they are not directly comparable to the
other types of presidents' contracts.17 0 There are no interim football coach contracts
in our sample.

165.
See, e.g., Second Amendment to Emp't Contract between the Bd. of Regents
of the Univ. of Wash. and Mark Emmert, President Univ. of Wash. (Nov. 6, 2006) (on file
with author) (adding additional deferred compensation plan); Second Amendment to Emp't
Agreement between Teresa A. Sullivan, President Univ. of Va., and the Rector and Visitors
of the Univ.of Va. (June 18, 2012) (on file with author) (adding a mediation clause).
166.
See Randall Thomas et al., Arbitration Clauses in CEO Employment
Contracts:An Empiricaland TheoreticalAnalysis, 63 VAND. L.R. 959, 978 (2010).

167.

Id.

168.

See Charles B. Neff, The TransitionalPresidency, 31 AGB REP. 16, 16-21

(Sept. 1989) ( stating that an interim president serves a specified period of time and is not a
candidate for the presidency).
169.
See NEFF & LEONDAR, supra note 58, at 12-13 (stating that an interim
president has limited duties for a specified period of time).
170.
Compare Emp't Contract between the Bd. of Trustees of State Insts. of Higher
Learning of the State of Miss. and Vance Watson, Interim President of Miss. State Univ. (Apr.
1, 2008) (on file with author) (discussing few clauses other than base salary and rights of
termination) with Emp't Contract between the Bd. of Trustees of State Insts. of Higher
Learning of the State of Miss. and Dr. Mark Keenum, President Miss. State Univ. (Jan. 5,
2009) (on file with author) (stating that Mark Keenum would receive a base salary as well as
supplemental salary from boosters and that six additional clauses are attached to the contract).
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32.8%
36.8%

Amended and Restated
Employment Contract

134

22.3%

Employment Agreement for
Interim President

44

7.3%

No Agreement

4

0.7%

Total

600

100%

Table 1A: Description of College President
Contracts Sample (1995-2014)
Finally, we note that there are a small number of college presidents that did
not have written employment contracts. As we discuss below, the football coaches
in our sample all have written employment contracts as well, although public
corporation CEOs frequently do not have such contracts. 17 1 One possible reason why
college presidents are unlike CEOs in this regard is that college presidents may have
relatively smaller amounts of firm-specific investments in their schools than CEOs
have in the firms they work for. This makes it relatively less expensive for a school
to replace the skills of the college president. For that reason, a college president is
in a position with more general skills and should seek to execute an employment
agreement. 172
In Table iB, we describe our sample of football coaches. The sample
period-2005 to 2013-differs slightly from that used in Table 1A (1995-2014)
because of data availability issues. The first three categories shown-employment
contract, amendment to employment contract, and amended and restated
employment contract-have the same definitions as in Table 1A. When we compare
the values in the two tables for the first three categories, we see important
differences. First, there are more football coach contracts than college president
contracts over a far shorter time period. There are also more amendments to
employment contracts, but far fewer amended and restated contracts.
These differences reflect the relatively short tenure of football coaches
compared to college presidents. When we calculate the average job tenure for
college presidents we find it is 7.6 years, with a median tenure of 6.0 years. By
comparison, the average tenure for football coaches is 4.6 years, and the median is
171.
Stuart L. Gillan et al., Explicit Versus Implicit Contracts:Evidence from CEO
Employment Agreements, 64 J. FIN. 1629, 1629 (2009).

172.

Cf id. at 1634.
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only 3.0 years. Given the relatively rapid turnover of football coaches compared to
college presidents, we expected that coaches would enter a larger number of initial
contracts. Based on our prior work, we also expected a larger number of football
coach contract amendments since they are frequently awarded for good performance
to ward off competing job offers. Similarly, we expected fewer amended and
restated employment contracts for football coaches because they frequently do not
remain employed by the same school as long as college presidents and are, therefore,
less likely to need to enter into an amended and restated contract.

Employment Contract

495

52.0%

Amended and Restated
Employment Contract

42

4.5%

Other Agreement Including
Employment Terms

13

1.5%

Total

947

100%

Amendment to
Employment Contract

Table iB: Description of Football Coaches
Contracts Sample (2005-2013)
The final category of football coach contracts is other agreements including
employment terms. This small category of contracts is comprised of memorandums
of understanding, offer letters, or letters of appointment. Memorandums of
understanding and offer letters are essentially temporary employment contracts that
1 73
supply the terms of employment while full written contracts are negotiated.
Letters of appointment are an abbreviated type of employment contract and are
rarely used.
We attribute the difference in job tenure to the relative ease of measuring
success for coaches: a football coach is evaluated by his win-loss record, and a
consistently losing coach will generally cost his college substantial revenues and be
fired. By contrast, given the diffuse relationship between a president's actions and a
university's overall performance, it will take longer to identify poorly performing
college presidents and discharge them.
The relatively frequent need to replace coaches has other implications as
well. One result of these frequent changes is that the coach recruitment process has
become highly professionalized. 1 7 4 Coaches routinely employ agents to represent
them in all employment matters, and schools respond by using executive search
173.
174.

Thomas & Van Hom, supra note 50, at 207.
Id. at 205-09.
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firms in almost all searches as well. Coaches' contracts are subject to extensive
negotiations and, as we see from the large number of contract amendments shown
in Table 1B, frequent changes. While the recruitment process for college presidents
is moving in this direction, it still remains less frequently run by professional search
firms and agents than that for football coaches. In the next section, we turn to a
comparison of college president and football coach compensation.
B. Comparing College President and Football Coach Compensation
We begin our analysis by looking at the overall compensation levels and
the breakdown of pay into its components. While some of this information is
contained in the employment contracts themselves, we also drew from other
databases to obtain additional information. We begin with some temporal
comparisons between the pay levels of college presidents and football coaches.
1. Year-By-Year Comparisons
In our sample, college president contracts contain information about their
initial base compensation but lack data on several other forms of pay that are
potentially important components of college president pay, including pay-forperformance amounts. In order to obtain complete information on college president
compensation, we obtained access to the Chronicle of Higher Education's executive
compensation database for public and private universities. This database has
complete information on all forms of college president pay beginning in 2010.175
Table 2A, below, contains the average amounts of each different category of
compensation for the college presidents in our sample for 2010-2014.
The definitions for the various components of pay are taken directly from
the data dictionary supplied by the Chronicle of Higher Education.1 7 6 The values
shown in the table are averages derived from the contracts of the college presidents
in our sample during the specified year.
Several observations are immediately apparent. First, salary ("Base
Compensation") is a very large percentage of total college president compensation,
ranging from approximately 90% to 96% of total pay. This dwarfs all other forms
of compensation, especially bonus pay, which leads us to conclude that college
175.
Dan Bauman &Brian O'Leary, Executive Compensation at Private and Public
Colleges,
CHRON.
HIGHER
EDUC.
(July
17,
2016),
http://www.chronicle.com/interactives/executive-compensation?cid#id=table-public_2015.
176.
They are as follows: "Base pay: total base salary provided to the chief
executive, [in the fiscal year specified], including compensation from private universityrelated foundations." Bonus pay is the total "value of all bonuses and incentive compensation
paid out to the chief executive" in the fiscal year. Severance pay is the total amount of
"payments made to the chief executive upon his or her resignation or firing, as determined by
his or her contract, separation agreement, or a legal settlement. This can include severance
pay, unused vacation pay, or other agreed-upon separation pay." Deferred compensation paid
out is the amount of deferred pay that was set aside in previous years and paid out in the year
in question. Deferred compensation set aside in prior years is not included in total
compensation. Retirement pay, or payments made by the university on behalf of the chief
executive to a retirement plan during the fiscal year, is also not included in total compensation.
Id.
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president pay is not very sensitive to performance. Second, from 2010 to 2014
college president total compensation did not rise rapidly: total pay only increased by
10% during this five-year time period, or less than $47,000 overall.
Third, "[ten] years ago, performance bonuses were rarely a part of
presidential compensation, but now they are increasingly common." 1 7 7 However, the
college presidents' contracts in our sample only occasionally disclose the criteria for
the payment of bonuses. Even in those instances, the language used is very general
and does not specify how the college's board of trustees will use the identified
factors to determine bonus pay. For example, Neal Smatresk's contract with the
University of North Texas stated that "the Board of Regents may approve on the
recommendation of the Chancellor an annual bonus [of up to 25% of Smatresk's
annual compensation] . . . based on objectives determined and agreed to by the
Chancellor and Smatresk." 1 78 It is unclear from the contract what weights the board
of trustees attaches to each of these criteria and when a bonus will be paid. In other
cases, performance goals are specified, but the method by which the board of
trustees calculates the amount of performance pay is vague. For instance, James
Cofer's contract with the University of Louisiana at Monroe required an annual
evaluation based on three system-wide goals and stated: "Upon conclusion of the
annual evaluation, the Board . . . shall determine any adjustments to the annual
salary, and/or benefits of the President." 17 9 In any event, Table 2A shows that pay
for performance is a small fraction of total compensation for college presidents.

177.
JOHNSTON & FERRARE, supra note 59, at 136-37.
178.
President's Emp't Agreement By and Between Univ. of N. Tex. Sys. and Neal
Smatresk, President, Univ. of N. Tex. §4.03 (Feb. 3, 2014) (on file with author).
179.
Amendment to Letter of Appointment Between Board of Supervisors of the
Univ. of La. Sys. and James Cofer, President, Univ. of La. (July 1, 2008) (on file with author).
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91

94

98

100

96

Co e

$389,390

$401,372

$404,375

$402,011

$415,111

opns
Compensation

$15,589

$19,375

$17,071

$25,676

$26,275

$584

$2,480

$25,650

$14,779

$11,363

$16,702

$31,048

$50,148

$6,853

$43,999

$43,239

$44,742

$51,944

$41,693

$31,348

$30,662

$38,054

$34,420

$39,088

$416,343

$437,991

$454,973

$503,485

$463,018

95.8%

93.9%

93.5%

89.8%

92.0%

Compensation

Severance
Compensation
Deferred Paid Out
Compensation

$0

Deferred Set
Aside

Compensation

Retirement

Co mentn

Compensation

Total
Compensation

Base

Pcae

Percentage

Table 2A: College Presidents' Total Average Compensation (By Year)
Total deferred pay is the second-most important component of college
president compensation. For example, in 2014, total deferred pay is the sum of
deferred paid out compensation ($41,693) plus deferred set aside compensation
($39,088), or about 17% ($80,781) of total compensation. Section 457 of the Internal
Revenue Code allows college presidents to have deferred compensation set aside
without being included in the president's current taxable income if the benefit is
subject to "a substantial risk of forfeiture." 80 This generally requires that there
"must be a substantial future service requirement that the chief executive will not
necessarily meet as a condition of receiving the benefits-a minimum term of
service in the presidency, certain performance goals, or both.""' Other more
complex tax strategies may also be used to allow the president to defer taxes on this
type of compensation. 18 2
Table 2B, below, displays the fixed pay components for FBS Division I
football coach compensation for the years 2005, 2009, and 2013. We selected these
three years in an effort to show the trend over time of football coach fixed pay, and
because we could pull complete data from the contracts we previously collected.
180.

ATWELL & WELLMAN, supra note

181.
182.

Id. at 41.
Id. at 42.

12, at 40-41.
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Using our football coach contract data, we pulled out the various compensation
components. The first component, salary, is defined as the amount of base salary
listed in the coach's employment contract. In situations where salary changes over
time, we continued to use the amount shown in the contract until a new contract, or
an amendment to the existing contract, was entered into, at which point we revised
the salary figure to reflect the amount in the new agreement. This was a reasonable
course of action given the overall frequency of contract revisions for football
coaches.
A football coach's largest fixed-pay component is service compensation.
Service compensation is the amount of fixed pay that the coach receives from any
radio, television, internet, speeches, alumni club appearances, or other similar
arrangements.1 8 3 As with salary, we used the amounts reported in the coach's
employment contract. We updated this amount whenever the coach entered into a
new employment contract or executed an amendment to an existing contract. In a
few cases, we could not unpack salary from service compensation because they are
listed together; in those instances, we entered the total amount as salary so that
service income will be underreported. Overall compensation levels, however, are
unaffected by this allocation.
The third component of football coach pay is "Camp." This is fixed pay
that a coach receives when he participates in a summer football camp. These
payments may be made by the university if the camp is university run, or
alternatively, the coach may run the camp himself, collect the monies from
participants, and pay all of the related expenses.
Endorsement pay is the final component of football coach fixed pay.
Universities often pay coaches pursuant to apparel, shoe, equipment, and other
endorsement contracts that the university enters into with outside businesses. We
entered the initial dollar amount stated in the employment contract similar to the
other components of fixed pay.

183.

Thomas & Van Hom, supra note 50, at 217.
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Salary

$252,974

$405,631

$547,167

Service

$396,486

$646,741

$900,277

Camp

$1,964

$9,865

$4,311

Endorsement

$73,750

$76,047

$119,067

Total Fixed
Compesaiod
Compensation

$725,174

$1,138,285

$1,570,823

Percentage Salary

34.88%

35.63%

34.83%

Percentage Service

54.67%

56.81%

57.31%

Table 2B: Football Coach Average Fixed Compensation
Examining Table 2B, we see that from 2005 to 2013, football coach fixed
compensation increased by $845,649, or more than 100% of its 2005 level. This is
more than ten times the rate of increase for total college president pay over the 20102014 time period shown in Table 2A. Service compensation is the most important
element of football coach pay, rising from around $400,000 in 2005 to more than
$900,000 in 2013. Moreover, its importance has increased as a percentage of total
football coach compensation over that same period.
The large increase for coaches is likely due to television and bowl revenue
attributable to college football.18 4 The SEC's experience is informative. In the 20142015 fiscal year, the SEC generated $112 million from bowl games and an additional
$347 million in TV deals. On a per-school basis, that meant roughly $25 million
from television and an additional $8 million from bowl games. 1 5 By comparison,
for 2017-2018, the SEC projects that after renegotiating its ESPN television contract
each member school will receive in excess of $44 million annually.18 6 Similar deals
at the other Power Five Conferences are projected to result in revenues in excess of
$20 million in 2014-2015,187 with likely more to come in the future.' College
presidents are unlikely to be able to show this type of value return.
In our earlier paper on football coaches, we calculated the potential level
for bonus payments for football coaches under a variety of different provisions in

184.

Id. at 218.

185.

Alsher, supra note 7.

186.
187.

Smith, supra note 9.
Id.

188.
See, e.g., Clay Travis, Every SEC School Will Make More TV Money Than
Texas, Notre Dame, OUTKICK COVERAGE: COLLEGE FOOTBALL BLOG (July 23, 2014, 10:57

AM),

http://www.outkickthecoverage.com/every-sec-school-will-make-more-tv-money-

than-texas-notre-dame-072314 (stating that the SEC, Notre Dame, and Texas have their own
television deals).
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their agreements.1 8 9 Specifically, we analyzed potential bonus payments for on-field
performance (such as winning the team's conference championship) and bonuses
for team academic performance levels (as measured by GPA, for instance).19 0
Excellent on-field performance can substantially increase football coach
compensation, but academic performance bonuses (bonuses based on the team's
academic successes) were a relatively small percentage of on-field bonuses.1 91
Given the relatively trivial amounts of college presidents' performance bonus
payments, it is apparent that football coach pay-for-performance is much more
substantial in amount.
2. Compensation Comparisonsby Size
To examine the effects of school size on college presidents' total
compensation, Table 3A presents 2013 data on the distribution of their total pay by
quartiles from the smallest undergraduate schools to the largest. All of the
compensation components are as defined in Table 2A. As we expected, there is a
substantial difference between total compensation for college presidents at the
smallest schools and those at the largest schools.1 9 2 The difference is most
pronounced for the base compensation levels, with the data showing a distinct
upward trend as the undergraduate population increases. This size difference may
be driven by a number of factors. For example, as with television contracts and
football coaches, the size differential for college president compensation may be the
result of the much greater revenues that are generated by having a larger
undergraduate population.193 Another possible explanation may be that the larger
institutions are more complex and more difficult to run, which creates the need to
recruit more talented leaders that require higher pay.

189.
Thomas & Van Horn, supra note 50, at 219-21.
Id.
190.
191.
Id.
192.
This finding is consistent with prior research. See Jeffrey Pfeffer & Jerry Ross,
The Compensation of College and University Presidents, 29 REs. HIGHER EDUC. 79, 85
(1988).
193.
See id. at 89 (finding presidents in larger, richer, private universities earn more,
but the effect of size is greater in private universities than in public).

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

934

[VOL. 58:901

Base
Compensation

$351,198

$415,941

$443,993

$472,555

Bonus
oens
Compensation

$16,168

$18,986

$18,994

$54,625

Severance
Comenatin
Compensation

$15,833

$0

$0

$42,898

Deferred Paid-Out
Compensation

$3,373

$9,557

$9,091

$6,656

Deferred
Set-Aside
Compensation

$42,376

$46,441

$46,053

$31,652

Retirement
Compensation

$42,708

$34,158

$41,707

$36,462

$386,573

$444,484

$472,078

$576,734

Total

C omat
Compensation
Base Percentage of
Total Compensation

85%
9

%

96%

Table 3A: College Presidents' Total Compensation (2013) (by Quartile)
There are several interesting aspects to this table. First, bonus
compensation, while generally small, is almost three times higher at the universities
in the largest quartile than at all other schools. One potential explanation for this
difference is that larger organizations have better observable performance metrics.
For example, larger universities have more alumni and therefore more potential
alumni donations. With more alumni, and greater potential to raise money, a college
president's efforts in fundraising might be more easily measured, and therefore, his
1 94
or her success can be more directly rewarded.
Second, severance pay at the largest schools is almost three times higher
than any other category of universities, and is zero at two of the others. These
payments are normally contingent on the college president being terminated without
cause by the school. 195
Third, some compensation levels are higher at the smaller quartile schools
than the largest schools. Deferred compensation is higher at all of the three smaller
quartile schools. Retirement compensation is higher at two of the three smaller
quartile schools than they are at the largest schools. These differences are relatively

194.
See generally Jensen & Meckling, supra note 27, at 323-24 (firms should
compensate employees based on the value that they create for the company).
195.
For further discussion of termination without cause for college presidents, see
infra Section JJJ.D.3.
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small compared to base compensation differences, but they may reflect an effort to
offset the large disparity in overall pay for college presidents of larger schools.
For comparison, Table 3B shows football coach fixed compensation by the
size of the schools' football programs. To make it more comparable to the college
president data in Table 3A, we show 2013 data. The most striking aspect of these
data is that schools in the largest quartile of football programs pay their coaches
fixed compensation that is six times more than schools in the smallest quartile.
Service income is the main driver of these differences, most likely because of the
large differences in television revenues for the bigger universities.

Salary

$281,303

$517,722

$481,714

$903,409

Service

$125,321

$481,704

$1,015,983

$1,498,872

Endorsement

$6,206

$61,252

$48,500

$252,704

Total Fixed
Compensation

$412,832

$1,074,679

$1,552,447

$2,664,955

Table 3B: Football Coach Fixed Compensation (2013) (by Quartile)
Football television contracts disproportionately benefit the bigger schools
with the better-known football programs. 1 96 The size of the university is also a driver
of college president compensation.1 97 For example, presidents at larger universities
can create greater value for the university through fundraising from a larger alumni
base.1 98 Greater school size also is associated with greater job complexity and a
greater number of job duties. Larger schools will need more highly qualified
personnel, who command a higher labor market premium, to effectively run them.199
For coaches, the size effect on compensation arises because most large college
football programs are members of one of the Power Five Conferences where revenue
from TV and bowl appearances is significantly higher than at other schools. Greater
value creation by coaches at the larger schools leads to greater compensation.
Having examined the large differences in compensation based on school
and program size, we turn next to a comparison of compensation differences
between college presidents and football coaches at the same schools.

196.

Kristi Dosh, A Comparison: Conference Television Deals, ESPN (Mar. 19,

2013),
http://www.espn.com/blog/playbook/dollars/post/_/id/3163/a-comparisonconference-television-deals (stating that the former Big East Conference, a conference known
largely for its basketball teams, will make $126 million over seven years, while the PAC-12
which is a strong football conference makes $250 million annually).
197.
Pfeffer & Ross, supra note 191, at 87-89 (finding that the size of a university
affected presidential compensation).
198.
See ATWELL & WELLMAN, supranote 12, at 12-13.
199.
See Banker et al., supra note 13, at 24.

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

936

[VOL. 58:901

3. Differences Between College Presidentsand Coaches by School
Another way of drawing comparisons between football coach
compensation and college president compensation is to do a school-by-school
comparison of the differences between them. In order to make the comparison
meaningful, we selected a single sample year-2012-to do the calculation. Table
4 presents these results with the schools grouped into two categories: the Power Five
Conferences and all other FBS Division I schools. For each group, we compared the
differences between football coaches' and college presidents' salaries and total
compensation.

President IJoach

Ratio

President I

Joach

Ratio

Mean

$429,851

$751,029

2.19

$453,336

$2,651,112

6.59

Median

$425,000

$400,000

0.98

$425,020

$2,349,995

5.55

All Other 111S Division I Schools
Salary

Total Compensation

President

Coach

Ratio

President

Coach

Ratio

Mean

$401,865

$360,895

0.89

$438,761

$712,576

1.61

Median

$386,000

$300,000

0.71

$397,500

$510,634

1.29

Table 4: Compensation Differences: Football Coaches and
College Presidents by School (2012)
The results are quite revealing. First, on average, Power Five coaches are
paid twice as much as the presidents of their home schools, although the median
data is almost identical (with presidents actually slightly higher). At all other FBS
Division I schools, however, college presidents' salaries are somewhat higher for
both the mean and median measures. Second, a cross-conference comparison of the
salary data shows that both college presidents and football coaches are paid more at
the Power Five Conference schools, although the differences in coaches' salaries are
much more significant. Most striking is that average salaries for Power Five
Conference football coaches are more than twice the average salaries paid to football
coaches at all other FBS Division I schools. In fact, the average salaries paid to
Power Five football coaches exceed the average total compensation of football
coaches at all other FBS Division I schools.
There is one other stark difference in the total compensation numbers. In
the Power Five Conferences, on average, football coaches make 6.59 times what
college presidents make overall, and the median differences are almost as large. As
can be seen from Table 2B, above, service income (largely television revenues) is
the biggest driver of these huge differences. For all other FBS Division I schools,
football coaches receive higher average and median pay than college presidents, but
the differences are much smaller (e.g. 1.61 times the average pay). The cross-
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conference comparisons show large differences between total pay for Power Five
Conference football coaches and the total pay of football coaches at all other FBS
Division I schools, with the average Power Five Conference coach getting about 3.7
times more. The same comparison for college presidents shows that the pay
differences between the two groups are quite small.
Overall, it is the football coaches at the Power Five Conferences whose pay
is so much different from that of all of the college presidents and that of the football
coaches at other conferences. As we discussed above, these differences appear to be
driven by the wide disparity between the television and bowl revenues paid to the
Power Five Conference schools, many of which have their own television networks
and multiple bowl-tie-in contracts. 200
4. Perquisite Comparisons
Another form of compensation is perquisites. The contracts we examined
have data on the level of perquisites for each coach and each college president. Table
5A contains information about college president perquisites and how they have
evolved over time. We focus on three important types of perquisites: country club
memberships, campus residences, and the use of a university car.201 Beginning with
country club memberships, we see that a sizeable majority of college presidents are
provided with such a membership in their employment contracts. However, there is
a clear downward trend in the percentage that is receiving this perquisite. Between
1995 and 2001, roughly 84% were given a membership, whereas between 2008 and
2014, this percentage dropped to about 69%, an overall decrease of 15%. This could
reflect a decline in the importance of country clubs in American society. 202
The other two major perquisites that are provided for in employment
contracts, campus residences and cars, have shown significant variations in their
presence over time. A substantial percentage of college presidents, for example, are
required by their employment contracts to live in a college-owned house on campus
as part of their duties and to use it for entertaining alumni and others. 2 03 For instance,
as of the latest time period, 2008-2014, approximately 45% of all college presidents
were required to reside in an on-campus, university-provided house. In the bare
majority of contracts, there is no mention of this requirement, although housing may
be covered in another agreement.

200.

See, e.g., Clay Travis, Every SEC School Will Make More TV Money than

Texas, Notre Dame, OUTKICK COVERAGE: COLLEGE FOOTBALL BLOG (July 23, 2014, 10:57

AM),
http://www.outkickthecoverage.com/every-sec-school-will-make-more-tv-moneythan-texas-notre-dame-072314 (stating that the SEC, Notre Dame, and Texas have their own
television deals).
201.
Other studies have found additional perquisites in some college president
contracts, including entertainment allowances, life insurance, professional development, and
provisions for health and wellness. JOHNSTON & FERRARE, supra note 59, at 136.
202.

See, e.g., RICHARD J. Moss, GOLF

AND THE AMERICAN COUNTRY CLUB

145

(2001) (noting the "steady decline in the importance of the private country club as an
institution").
203.
NEFF & LEONDAR, supranote 58, at 77 ("The majority of institutions, however,
do provide a president's house or a housing allowance as part of the compensation package
and because they expect the president to carry on a certain amount of entertaining at home.").
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1995-2001 2002-2007 2008-2014
Club Membership
Provided

84.15%

79%

68.87%

No Mention

15.85%

21%

31.13%

Campus Residence
1995-2001 2002-2007 2008-2014
On-Campus
Residence Required

41.98%

33%

45.17%

On-Campus
Residence Permitted

0%

1.50%

1.93%

No Mention

58.02%

65.5%

52.9%

Ulniversity Car
1995-2001 2002-2007 2008-2014
Choice of
Allowance
Car or CarorAllwace

1.22%

3.16%

5.28%

Car is Provided

32.93%

24.74%

34.15%

No Mention

65.85%

71.58%

60.57%

Table 5A: College President Perquisites (Percentage of Contracts)
Roughly 30-40% of college presidents are provided with a car or a car
allowance as part of their employment terms. There is a small increase in this
percentage over time. A majority of the college president employment contracts do
not mention cars, but they could be provided in some other agreement. College
presidents' free use of cars may be an important tool for facilitating performance of
their duties, such as visiting alumni.
We expected to find that college presidents' employment contracts would
also provide the executives with football tickets and personal skyboxes as part of
their compensation packages. With the exception of one contract, 204 however, such
perquisites are not expressly mentioned. Given the tremendous importance of
fundraising activities for FBS Division I college presidents at football games, we
204.
Employment Agreement Between Bd. of Trustees of Mich. State Univ. and
Lou Anna Kimsey Simon, President, Mich. State Univ. §9 (Dec. 9, 2011) (stating
"complimentary tickets to the University academic, athletic, and cultural events shall be made
available for the President, her immediate family, and official guests").
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speculate that all college presidents are provided with tickets and skyboxes (where
they exist) as part of their jobs. It may be unnecessary to include them in the terms
of their employment agreements.
For football coaches, the comparable set of perquisite data looks somewhat
different. First of all, as Table 5B shows, there is a strong trend demonstrating
increasing perquisites for football coaches over time. Cars, for instance, are now
extremely common in their employment contracts (87.1% for 2008-2013). Country
club memberships have also steadily increased, appearing in a substantial majority
of contracts (62.8%). Football tickets (60.4%) and skyboxes (33.2%) are provided
to coaches at many universities, perhaps in part to assist them in fundraising from
alumni. One big difference in the availability of perquisites is the absence of campus
residences for football coaches. This may be offset by a small, but increasing
percentage of contracts with provisions for the coach's personal use of the
university's plane.

Perquisites

1995-2001

2002-2007

2008-2013

Car

65.8%

79.0%

87.1%

Skybox

8.8%

25.9%

33.2%

Tickets

35.2%

47.6%

60.4%

Club

43.5%

52.4%

62.8%

Airplane

0.0%

1.5%

4.9%

Table 5B: College Football Coaches Perquisites
For both coaches and presidents, contractual perquisites align with the
resources that will facilitate the performance of their jobs. University presidents
need to spend a significant amount of time entertaining potential donors. Having a
country club membership and a university house facilitates this, and their job
performance improves. Football coaches spend much of their time recruiting new
players every year, and therefore, are frequently on the road visiting recruits. Access
to a car or a plane can reduce the wear and tear on the coach, making him more
effective and successful at his job.
Having surveyed the compensation differences between college presidents
and football coaches in Sections A and B above, we turn next to the legal terms of
their employment contracts to see what additional insights can be gained from a
comparison of these two important groups of employees.
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C. Contract Length Comparisons
Contract length is an important legal component that is contained in many
employment contracts. 2 05 Contract length is the result of a "compromise between the
individual's need to have a period of commitment and the institution's need to
review performance and possibly make adjustments within a reasonable time." 2 06
Table 6 compares the contract length for college president employment contracts
with those in football coaches' agreements.
While college presidents' contracts are becoming more likely to include a
term of years, 2 0 7 the most striking feature of Table 6 is that football coach
employment contracts are more than twice as likely as college president contracts to
have a fixed term. Furthermore, for those contracts that do contain a fixed term,
football coach contracts are far more likely to be for a greater number of years. For
example, roughly two-thirds of football coach contracts are for five years or more,
whereas only slightly less than one-fifth of college president contracts are for such
long terms. A third notable difference is that a sizeable fraction of college presidents
work under contracts that state they are at-will employees of the university, whereas
no college football coach contracts in this sample included that language.

Contract Length in Y'ears

College Presidents

Football Coaches

At-Will Employment

8.32%

0.00%

1 Year

5.73%

3.74%

2 Years

2.59%

2.46%

3 Years

11.09%

8.65%

4 Years

7.21%

18.38%

5 Years

14.42%

41.67%

Greater Than 5 Years

4.00%

24.36%

Indefinite Term or
Term Not Provided

Percentage of
Fixed-Term Contracts
Table 6: Contract Length Comparisons (Percentage of Contracts)
What accounts for these differences? One reason may be that college
football coaches are more concerned about theirjob security than college presidents.
As we noted earlier, football coaches' average tenure is 4.6 years and their median

205.
"The contract should specify the term of the presidential appointment and
include provisions for compensation if either the president or the board terminates
employment before the end of the contract period." ATWELL & WELLMAN, supra note 12, at
37.
206.
JOHNSTON & FERRARE, supra note 59, at 130.
207.
NEFF & LEONDAR, supra note 58, at 81 ("In recent years, there has been a
distinct trend toward term appointments.").
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job tenure is only 3.0 years. Our data show that college presidents have a much
longer average tenure (7.6 years) and median tenure (6.0 years). Given the relatively
rapid turnover of football coaches compared to college presidents, football coaches
will negotiate for greater contractual protections for their jobs, including fixed term
lengths for more years, which can lead to higher severance payments if they are
terminated early in the contract without cause. 2 0 8
Another reason for longer football coach employment contracts relates to
the recruitment process for college athletes. Football coaches must be able to assure
potential high school recruits of their ability to coach the new recruits throughout
their college careers. 2 09 Given the intensive interactions football coaches have with
the relatively small number of football players over several years, students want to
be sure the coach will continue to be there. This means that a five-year or longer
contract is necessary to help convince potential students that the coach who recruited
them will remain at the school for their entire undergraduate terms, usually four or
five years. College presidents, on the other hand, do not have the same personal
daily contact with students because the student body generally contains thousands
of undergraduates, and the college president will have limited time to spend with
any of them. Most college presidents are largely focused on fundraising and
administrative duties, often not even teaching any classes.
A third potential explanation for the differences in contract length is the
close relationship between most college presidents and the university trustees that
are ultimately charged with managing the school. Many trustees are large donors to
the university that have been recruited to join the board of trustees by the college
president. They work closely with college presidents in a variety of roles and are
generally dependent on college presidents for almost all of the information that they
have about the school. Not surprisingly, this leads to a comfortable, friendly
relationship between the board of trustees and college presidents; one where there is
not a constant threat of termination. Ultimately, this relationship limits the need for
strong legal protections, such as a fixed, long-term employment contract.
Football coaches, on the other hand, are judged on their win-loss record
every season. Even a well-established coach that has a mediocre year or two may
find himself out of a job. 2 1 0 Coaches cannot rely solely on close connections to
boosters, or trustees, to keep them employed if their teams fail to meet the generally
very high expectations of alumni and others. As a result, they bargain for longer,
fixed-term contracts to protect themselves in the event of termination.

208.
Coaches are generally paid for the remaining years of their contracts when
they are terminated without cause. Thomas & Van Horn, supra note 50, at 235. For further
discussion of termination without cause, see infra Section IJ.D.3.
209.
Thomas & Van Horn, supra note 50, at 228.
210.
This was demonstrated recently when the University of Georgia fired its very
successful football coach for not winning enough big games. Mark Schlabach, Mark Richt
Out
at
Georgia,
ESPN
(Nov.
30,
2015),
http://espn.go.com/collegefootball/story/_/id/14249377/mark-richt-fired-coach-georgia-bulldogs ("Richt had the fifthbest winning percentage among active FBS coaches").
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D. Termination Provisions: With Cause and Without Cause
Longer fixed-term contracts are only part of the way that employees protect
their economic interests in the event that they are terminated. But as any labor lawyer
knows, having a long-term employment contract does not guarantee that you will be
employed for the full term. "A president's eventual departure may result from an
agreed-upon schedule; board dissatisfaction with the president's performance or the
president's with the board's; retirement, disability, or death; interest in an outside
opportunity; or some combination of these reasons."211 Even if the president
performs well, the board retains the ability to breach the contract and terminate
employees, although it may be liable for damages arising from the breach.
The amount of damages paid depends on whether the employee was
terminated with or without cause. Termination with cause occurs when the employee
commits a bad act or harmful omission that is defined in the employment contract
as constituting grounds for-cause termination. As a result, most employment
contracts contain very carefully drafted definitions for what cause means. An
employee that breaches an employment contract for cause will normally receive no
severance compensation. 2 12
By comparison, an employee that is terminated without cause is frequently
entitled to contractually specified severance payments or, alternatively, to commonlaw damages for breach, often equal to the full amount of all the compensation that
2 13
the employee would have been entitled to if the contract had been fully performed.
In other words, "Severance pay is common when a board chooses to end the contract
214
without showing cause before the end of the contract's term."
Clearly, it is preferable from the employee's perspective to be terminated
without cause than to be fired for cause. For these reasons, counsel for top
employees will strongly resist including strong definitions of cause in their clients'
2 16
employment contracts. 2 15 All of these same considerations apply at universities.

211.

JOHNSTON & FERRARE, supra note 59, at 131.
212.
See Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An EmpiricalAnalysis of CEO
Employment Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain For?, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REv.

231, 237-38 (2006).
213.
In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 35 (Del. 2006) (ruling
that a former employee was entitled to $130 million in severance payments after he was fired
without cause). In many circumstances, the employee would still have a duty to mitigate the
employer's damages by seeking alternative employment. Frye v. Memphis State Univ., 806
S.W.2d 170, 173 (Tenn. 1991) (stating that when an employee is wrongfully terminated he
"is only required to exercise reasonable diligence in seeking other employment of a similar
or comparable nature").
214.
ATWELL & WELLMAN, supra note 12, at 42.
215.
See Schwab & Thomas, supra note 211, at 238.
216.
Stated differently:
The board needs to know, after a period of initial acceptance has passed,
that the new president will not desert on short notice, and the president
needs assurance that he or she will be given reasonable leave with salary
if circumstances require a change. Further, the absence of clear
termination arrangements after a presidential tenure has reached a
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1. For-Cause Termination Clauses
From a university's point of view, for-cause termination provisions are an
important protection from the damage to its reputation and image that could arise if
a college president or football coach engages in serious misconduct. 217 By carefully
enumerating a series of offenses that will trigger for-cause termination, the
university can try to deter or, if unsuccessful, to punish the offenders for their
actions. The complete loss of all severance pay is a significant deterrent to most
high-level employees, such as college presidents or football coaches. There is also
likely to be severe reputational harm to the employee who is terminated for cause.
Given these harsh penalties, a college president, or football coach, will
negotiate aggressively to limit the definition of what constitutes cause in the
employment contract. Table 7A provides a breakdown of all of the defined terms
that constitute grounds for for-cause terminations with the data showing the
percentage of college president employment contracts in the full sample that contain
the particular provisions. 2 18

reasonable length can lead to lawsuits, which are expensive and
damaging to the institution.
NEFF & LEONDAR,

supra note 58, at 81.

217.
Some commentators have argued that football coaches have been involved in
far too many instances of serious misconduct. See, e.g. Pete Volk & Jason Kirk, The Bobby
Petrino Controversy Timeline: A Decade of Shenanigans, SB NATION (Aug. 11, 2016, 11:35
AM),
http://www.sbnation.com/college-football/2014/1/9/5288648/bobby-petrinolouisville-scandal-timeline.
218.
As these contracts often contain multiple terms, the numbers shown in the
table do not sum to 100%.
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Gross Misconduct

6.4%

Unprofessional Conduct

19.0%

Neglect of Duties

18.4%

Breach of Contract

14.5%

Felony

13.3%

Moral Turpitude

22.9%

Fraud

17.7%

Violation of College Policies

15.0%

Violation of Ethical Standards

1.6%

Gambling

0.0%

Substance Abuse

3.4%

Conflict of Interest

0.0%

Drug Test Program Failure

0.0%

Absence from Work

8.8%

[VOL. 58:901

219
Table 7A: College President For-Cause Termination ProvisionS

219.
For the college president employment contracts, we used the following
definitions: Gross Misconduct was coded if the contract listed it as grounds for termination
with cause. Unprofessional Conduct was coded if the contract listed unprofessional behavior
or other conduct that reflects negatively upon the university as grounds for termination with
cause. Neglect of Duties was coded if the contract had provisions that stated that neglect of
duties, failure to perform duties, inability to perform duties, or absence from duties constituted
grounds for termination with cause. Breach of Contractwas coded if the contract stated that
a breach of the employment contract was grounds for termination with cause. Felony was
coded if the contract stated that the conviction of a crime constituting a felony was grounds
for termination with cause. Moral Turpitude was coded if the contract stated that the
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or any other provision relating to moral
turpitude-including things such as violation of antidiscrimination policies or sexual
harassment-was grounds for termination for cause. Fraud was coded if the contract listed
either fraud or dishonesty as grounds for termination with cause. Violation of College Policies
was coded if the contract that the violation of college policy, constitution, by-laws; failure by
president to respond promptly and accurately to any violation that materially adversely affects
the school; violation of any federal, state or local law, regulation, ordinance or constitutional
provision (non-felony related) for termination with cause. Violation of EthicalStandards was
coded if the contract stated that the violation of an ethics standard was grounds for termination
with cause. Gambling was coded if the contract listed gambling or betting of any kind as
grounds for termination with cause. Substance abuse was coded if the contract listed
substance abuse of any kind as grounds for termination with cause. Conflict of Interest was
coded if the contract listed a conflict of interest as grounds for termination with cause. Drug
Test ProgramFailurewas coded if the contract listed failure to cooperate in the enforcement
and implementation of any drug testing program as grounds for termination with cause.
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The most interesting feature of this table is how infrequently many of these
terms appear in the college president employment contracts. The most common forcause termination provision is moral turpitude, which shows up in about one-quarter
of the contracts, 2 20 followed closely by unprofessional conduct, neglect of duties,
fraud, violation of college policies, breach of contract, and commission of a felony,
all of which occur in between 13 andl9% of the contracts. In contrast, gambling,
failing a drug test, and acting with a conflict of interest are not included in any of
the college president contracts as grounds of for-cause termination. In fact, as
explored more fully in Table 9A, during the 2008-2014 time period almost twothirds of college president contracts did not contain for-cause termination provisions
at all.
The contrast with college football coach contracts is stark. Table 7B shows
that in our full sample more than 80% of all college football coach contracts have
for-cause termination provisions that include gross misconduct, neglect of duties,
and violations of NCAA rules. In addition, unprofessional conduct, breach of
contract, and moral turpitude show up in between 50-60% of all football coach
contracts. All of the remaining terms appeared less frequently, although most are in
the double-digit percentages of contracts. In comparison to college president
agreements, during the 2008-2013 time period only a tiny fraction (3.23%) of
football coach employment contracts did not contain a for-cause termination clause.
Plainly, football coaches are much more likely than college presidents to have strong
contractual language in their agreements defining the grounds of for-cause
termination.

Absence was coded if the contract stated that a prolonged absence-possibly due to illness or
disability-was grounds for termination with cause.
220.
Moral turpitude has been defined as an "act or behavior that gravely violates
moral sentiment or accepted moral standards of a community and is a morally culpable quality
held to be present in some criminal offenses as distinguished from others." Moral Turpitude,
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY

(5th ed. 1979).
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Gross Misconduct

85%

Unprofessional Conduct

65.4%

Neglect of Duties

82.3%

Breach of Contract

60.8%

Felony

31.1%

Moral Turpitude

50.5%

Fraud

30.5%

Violation of NCAA rules

93.1%

Gambling

11.7%

Substance Abuse

15.1%

Conflict of Interest

4.6%

Drug Test Program Failure

7.7%

Table 7B: Football Coaches For-Cause
Termination Provisions (Percentage of Contracts)

221

The unique nature of the coaches' job helps explain the difference between
football coaches' and college presidents' for-cause-termination provisions. For
221.
For the college football coach employment contracts, we used the following
definitions: Gross misconduct was coded if the contract listed it as grounds for termination
with cause. Unprofessionalconduct was coded if the contract listed unprofessional behavior
or other conduct that reflects negatively upon the university as grounds for termination with
cause. Neglect of Duties was coded if the contract had provisions that stated that neglect of
duties, failure to perform duties, inability to perform duties, or absence from duties constituted
grounds for termination with cause. Breach of Contractwas coded if the contract stated that
a breach of the employment contract was grounds for termination with cause. Felony was
coded if the contract stated that the conviction of a crime constituting a felony was grounds
for termination with cause. Moral Turpitude was coded if the contract stated that the
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or any other provision relating to moral
turpitude-including things such as violation of antidiscrimination policies or sexual
harassment-was grounds for termination for cause. Fraud was coded if the contract listed
either fraud or dishonesty as grounds for termination with cause. Violation of NCAA rules
was coded if the contract listed a violation of NCAA, conference, or university rules; the
failure to report a violation of NCAA, conference, or university rules; counseling those under
the coach's supervision to fail to respond promptly and accurately to any NCAA, conference,
university, or other official inquiry; or the coach's failure to respond promptly and accurately
to any NCAA, conference, university, or other official inquiry as grounds for termination with
cause. Gambling was coded if the contract listed gambling or betting of any kind as grounds
for termination with cause. Substance Abuse was coded if the contract listed substance abuse
of any kind as grounds for termination with cause. Conflict of Interest was coded if the
contract listed a conflict of interest as grounds for termination with cause. Drug Test Program
Failure was coded if the contract listed failure to cooperate in the enforcement and
implementation of any drug testing program as grounds for termination with cause.
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example, in football coach contracts a violation of NCAA rules will invariably be
included as a grounds for termination, whereas there is no equivalent set of
obligations for college presidents. Gambling by a coach is also grounds for
termination, which most likely reflects concerns about coaches betting on sports
games. The remaining differences may be the result of the relatively high likelihood
of termination and corresponding damage to the future employability of the football
coach. Coaches may also wind up in scandals more often than presidents. 2 2 2
University presidents are fired by their home schools much less frequently. 223 Thus,
there may be less need to contractually lay out cause-termination provisions for
college presidents.
2. Evolution of Cause Termination Provisions
A related issue is how the use of the various defined terms of for-cause
termination has evolved over time. Table 8A displays these changes over three time
periods: 1995-2001, 2002-2007, and 2008-2014. In every case except one, 2 2 4 each
clause was used at an equal or greater frequency. 225 This strongly suggests that
college president employment contracts are moving in the direction of including
more terms in the definition of for-cause termination and increasing their protection
of the university's interests.

222.
See, e.g., Top 10 Coaching Scandals in College Sports History, ONLINE U.
BLOG (Apr. 6, 2010), http://www.sbnation.com/college-football/2014/1/9/5288648/bobbypetrino-louisville-scandal-timeline; Volk & Kirk, supranote 217.
223.
See supra Section JJJ.A (comparing average tenure of college presidents and
football coaches); see also AM. COUNCIL ON EDUC., THE AMERICAN COLLEGE PRESIDENT 5

Tbl.2 (2012); see also What is the Average Tenure of a College or University President,Ass'N
GOVERNING
BOARDS,
http://agb.org/faq/what-is-the-average-tenure-of-a-college-oruniversity-president (last visited October 27, 2016) (stating that the average length a college
president serves is seven years).
224.
The one exception is violation of ethical standards, which declined from 19952001 to 2002-2007, but then increased in the final time period.

225.

Gambling, conflict of interest, and drug-test-program failure did not appear in

any college president contracts over the entire sample period.
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Defined Term

1995--2001

2002-2007

2008-24)14

Gross Misconduct

0.0%

5.0%

10.0%

Unprofessional Conduct

9.8%

17.3%

24.2%

Neglect of Duties

7.3%

16.3%

24.6%

Breach of Contract

6.1%

9.9%

21.6%

Felony

3.7%

12.9%

17.4%

Moral Turpitude

13.4%

21.3%

28.6%

Fraud

2.4%

17.8%

23.5%

Violation of College Policy

12.2%

14.4%

17.3%

Violation of Ethical Standards

6.1%

0.5%

1.2%

Gambling

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

Substance Abuse

0.0%

3.5%

4.6%

Conflict of Interest

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

Drug Test Program Failure

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

Absence from Work

7.3%

7.9%

10.4%

Table 8A: College President For-Cause Termination Provisions
over Time (Percentages)
The same trends can be seen in the data for football coach contracts shown
in Table 8B. When we compare the frequency of for-cause terms in 1995-2001 with
their usage in 2008-2013, we see that every single category has become more
common over time. For example, in the most recent time period, breach of contract
and unprofessional conduct appear in roughly 70% of all college football coach
employment contracts as a ground for termination.
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Neglect ot Duties
Breach of Contract

47.2%

65.2%

67.1%

Felony

22.8%

30.2%

38.8%

Moral Turpitude

48.7%

47.3%

56.1%

Fraud

14.0%

29.6%

42.6%

Unprofessional Conduct

54.9%

64.3%

72.5%

Violation of NCAA Rules

87.0%

94.2%

96.5%

Gambling

2.6%

11.0%

17.8%

Substance Abuse

5.2%

13.1%

23.2%

Conflict of Interest

2.6%

4.3%

5.4%

Drug-Test-Program Failure

0.5%

6.7%

12.7%

Gross Misconduct

0.0%

0.6%

1.6%

Table 8B: Football Coach For-Cause Termination Provisions
over Time (Percentage of Contracts)
Finally, we examine the change in the number of defined terms that are
contained in the definition of what is considered cause in our employment contracts.
Table 9A illustrates the trend of the number of for-cause termination terms in college
president contracts over the same time periods as previously discussed. The first row
shows that a large majority of these contracts contained no for-cause termination
provisions, although this percentage has declined over time. However, even in the
most recent time period (2008-2014), 66.09% of college president contracts do not
contain for-cause termination provisions. The contracts in the next-largest category
(10.03%) during that time period, include six defined terms in their definition of
cause. Generally speaking, there is a strong trend toward having more enumerated
terms in the cause definitions of these agreements.
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0

81.14%

73.46%

66.09%

1

4.76%

1.90%

3.46%

2

0%

0.47%

0%

3

1.19%

3.79%

0.69%

4

5.95%

4.27%

4.15%

5

1.19%

7.11%

7.27%

6

4.76%

5.69%

10.03%

7

0%

2.84%

5.88%

8

0%

0.47%

2.08%

9

0%

0%

.35%

Table 9A: Evolution of the Number of For-Cause Termination
Clauses in College President Contracts (Percentage of Contracts)
We were interested to see whether the change in the number of for-cause
termination definitions over time is statistically significant. In order to make this
determination, we calculated a chi-squared statistic. 2 26 We found that the value of
the chi-squared statistic is 39.17, which is statistically significant at less than the 1%
level of significance. This is consistent with the claim that college president
employment contracts have shown an increased number of for-cause termination
provisions over the course of our sample period.
A similar trend, albeit at a much higher level, can be seen in the football
coach contracts. The percentage of contracts without for-cause termination
provisions drops steadily from 12.95% at the beginning of the sample period to
3.23% at the end of the sample period. Moreover, for contracts with the highest
number of listed terms per contract, the percentage of contracts increased during the
sample period.

226.
See generally PRISCILLA E. GREENWOOD & MICHAEL S. NIKULIN, A GUIDE TO
CHI-SQUARED TESTING (1996) (stating that a chi-squared statistic helps a researcher test the

"goodness-of-fit" of a data distribution).
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0

12.95%

5.79%

3.23%

1

6.74%

5.49%

3.50%

2

6.74%

1.22%

1.35%

3

6.22%

10.98%

10.78%

4

32.64%

26.83%

19.95%

5

26.94%

25.30%

21.02%

6

3.63%

6.71%

12.67%

7

1.55%

7.93%

11.32%

8

2.07%

7.32%

7.55%

9

0.52%

2.13%

5.66%

10

0%

0.30%

1.89%

12

0%

0%

1.08%

Table 9B: Football Coaches Evolution of Number of
For-Cause Termination Clauses (Percentage of Contracts)
To test the significance of these changes over time, we calculated a chisquared statistic. 2 2 7 We found that it has a value of 116.14, which is significant at
less than the 1% level of significance. This is strong evidence that the number of
defined terms in the for-cause termination provisions in all college football coach
contracts has increased over time.
Why are there more terms in the for-cause termination definitions for these
coaches and college presidents over time? One possibility is that the cost to the
school of bad behavior by top executives, particularly by football coaches, 2 28 has
increased over time with the larger revenues generated by the sport. 2 2 9 Schools are
likely more attentive to the reasons for football coaches' forced departures,
especially because they have to pay large severances to football coaches that are
23 0
terminated without cause.
Another explanation may be that the increased professionalization of the
hiring process has resulted in schools standardizing the contract language in an effort
to protect themselves. As discussed in Part II, the hiring process for college
presidents and football coaches increasingly involves executive search firms and
agents, at least for football coaches. Combined with the greater use of benchmarking
for compensation and contract terms, this contracting process may have encouraged

227.
228.

For further information about chi-squared statistics, see generally id.
Volk & Kirk, supranote 217.

229.

NCAA, Eleven-Year Trends in Division 1 Athletics Finances 12 (Sept. 2015),

http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/DivisionlElevenYearFinances-20150917.pdf
(stating median total revenues have increased by 120.7% from 2004 to 2014).
230.
Hobson & Rich, supra note 57.
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universities to include stronger contractual language in their top executives'
employment contracts.
3. Without-Cause Termination Payments
There are good reasons why schools may prefer to terminate an executive
without cause. "Termination without cause, from the board's point of view, is often
the cleanest basis for separation from employment, allowing the removal of a
problematic incumbent without the details having to be made public." 23 1 When
college presidents or football coaches are terminated without cause by their schools,
they may be entitled under the terms of their employment contracts to receive
severance payments.
How frequently do these top employees receive such payments and how
has that changed over time? We begin with an analysis of college presidents'
employment contracts. Table 10A shows the percentages of college president
contracts containing without-cause termination provisions and how the likelihood
of such clauses appearing in these agreements has changed over our sample period.

No

90.12%

74.63%

71.43%

Yes

9.88%

23.38%

28.19%

Table 1OA: College President Without-Cause
Termination Payments (Percentage of Contracts)
Surprisingly, over the entire sample period, a substantial majority (108
agreements or approximately 80% of the sample) of college president employment
contracts do not include any provision for the payment of severance compensation
in a without-cause termination. By contrast, in 2008-2014, Table 10B shows that
over 83% of coaches do have such provisions in their agreements. Equally
interesting, the percentage of college president contracts with such provisions has
increased significantly over that same period. While only about 10% had such
clauses in the 1995-2001 time period, by 2008-2014 roughly 29% of college
presidents' contracts included such without-cause termination payments. A similar
trend toward greater use of without-cause termination payments for football coaches
is evident in Table lOB.

231.

JOHNSTON AND FERRARE, supra note 59, at 131.
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No

41.97%

29.57%

16.17%

Yes

58.03%

70.43%

83.83%

Table 10B: Football Coach Without-Cause
Termination Payments (Percentage of Contracts)
In addition, we note that only a handful of college president employment
contracts contain provisions that require presidents to mitigate damages paid by the
school if they were terminated without cause. 23 2 By comparison, roughly one-third
of the football coach contracts in our sample require a departing coach to mitigate
his damages. 23 3 Sometimes, the same school will treat these employees differently.
For instance, Mark Helfrich, Oregon's football coach, had a mitigation clause in his
contract, while Michael Gottfredson, Oregon's president, had no mitigation clause
in his contract.234
For those contracts that contain without-cause termination severance
provisions, Table 11 illustrates the distribution of payments provided for in these
employment agreements. For football coaches, we see that over two-thirds provide
for a minimum of three-years-base salary, while almost one-third pay more than five
years of base salary. By comparison, for college presidents, the mean level of these
payments is 1.69 years of base salary, which is much lower than for the football
coaches. As demonstrated by the table, college presidents rarely receive payments
of more than three years of their base salary.

232.
We found a total of eight college president contracts in our sample that
contained mitigation clauses. Adam Herbert's 2003 contract with Indiana University is typical
of these agreements. Section V, paragraph 4 states: "In the event the President is terminated
without cause and does not return to the tenured faculty position, the President agrees to
mitigate the University's obligation to continue the payments set forth in this section by
making reasonable and diligent efforts to obtain new employment." Employment Agreement
Between the Trustees of Ind. Univ. and Adam Herbert, President, Ind. Univ. §V (June 5,
2003) (on file with author).
233.
Thomas & Van Horn, supra note 50, at 235.
234.
Compare Employment Agreement Between the Univ. of Or. and Mark
Helfrich, Head Coach, Univ. or Or. Intercollegiate Football Team §6.2(e) (Jan. 20, 2013) (on
file with author), with Employment Agreement and Notice of Appointment Between the Or.
State Bd. of Higher Educ. and Dr. Michael Gottfredson, President, Univ. of Or. (Aug. 1, 2012)
(on file with author) (No mitigation clause).
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Payment = 0

12.5%

82.09%

0 < Payment < 1 Year

1.6%

2.16%

Payment = 1 Year

2.0%

9.12%

1 < Payment < 2 Year

5.2%

1.66%

Payment = 2 Year

2.3%

1.33%

2 < Payment < 3 Year

5.9%

.66%

Payment = 3 Year

3.3%

1.33%

3 < Payment < 4 Year

8.8%

.17%

Payment = 4 Year

5.9%

.17%

4 < Payment < 5 Year

11.9%

0%

Payment = 5 Year

11.5%

.33%

Payment > 5 Year

29.0%

1.0%

Not Mentioned or Other Form

0%

0%

Table 11: Comparison of Without-Cause Termination Payments for College
Presidents and Football Coaches (Percentages of Base Salary)
A possible explanation for the football coaches' larger severance payments
is their increased likelihood of termination. The average coach's short job tenure
encourages stronger upfront negotiations on what happens to the parties when the
coach leaves either voluntarily or involuntarily. Short job tenure means coaches
have a greater need for compensation for the increased risk of financial harm, which
may result from being fired without cause.
Relatedly, some top employees may be required to make payments to their
employer if they choose to resign from their position without providing an
enumerated "good reason" for their action. 23 5 If a coach is highly successful, the
hiring university tries to prevent him from leaving too easily by increasing
"switching costs" for the university that lures him away. Basically, the hiring
university will negotiate to include contractual language that requires the voluntarily
departing coach (and indirectly the coach's new school) to make substantial contract
buyout payments if the coach leaves. 236

235.
For CEOs, good reason for quitting is commonly defined to include the CEO
getting paid less, being transferred to a distant location, or being forced to take on less job
responsibility. Schwab & Thomas, supra note 211, at 253.
236.
In our earlier work, we found that approximately 37% of coaches owe
payments to their former employer if they leave their current coaching position upon any
without-cause resignation, while an additional 47% of coaches owe a payment for any
without-cause resignation only if they are accepting a position at another university. Where
no buyout clause is included in the contract, universities typically allow the coach to depart
without seeking damages for the harm caused by his departure. Thomas & Van Horn, supra
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But no college president is required to make any payment if they resign
without good reason, even if they do so to accept another position as the president
of another university. In addition, many college presidents negotiate to receive a
tenured position at their school as part of their incoming compensation package.
This means that they automatically have a fallback job in the event that they are
terminated by their university from their position as president.
E. Noncompetition and Arbitration Provisions
Noncompetition agreements and arbitration clauses are frequently
employed by public corporations. 23 7 Companies prefer noncompetition agreements
because they provide significant protection against key employees walking away
from the firm with sensitive information and working for competing businesses. 23 8
Arbitration provisions require employees to litigate employment disputes in private
rather than use the courts. Both types of provisions are common in CEO employment
39
contracts. 2
There is little evidence that noncompetition clauses are employed in either
college president or football coach contracts. In our sample, only two college
president contracts include noncompetition clauses: John Dunn's 2012 contract with
Western Michigan2 0 and Mark Schlissel's 2014 contract with Michigan."' In our
prior work, only 23 contracts out of the 429 football coaches in our sample employed
noncompetition provisions.24 2 It seems likely that football coaches would be
opposed to having such clauses in their contracts. Their concern would be that a
broad noncompetition clause would stop them from being able to engage in future
coaching positions.
More generally, it seems likely that both types of top employees have skills
that are less firm-specific and involve less-confidential information than those of
CEOs. In other words, the university may have less concern that a college president
or football coach will be able to remove sensitive information to another university
and be able to compete with their former employer unfairly, than a company may
have if its CEO did the same thing.
In a related vein, CEO employment contracts often include arbitration
clauses because, in that setting, both parties prefer private resolution of their
note 50, at 237. See generally Martin J. Greenberg, College Coaching Contracts Revisited: A
Practical Perspective, 12 MARQ. SPORTs L. REv. 127, 234 (2001) (discussing buyout

provisions).
237.
Norman D. Bishara et al., An EmpiricalAnalysis of Noncompetition Clauses
and Other Restrictive Postemployment Covenants, 68 VAND. L. REv. 1, 28 (2015) (finding

that 80% of contracts contain covenants not to compete); see also Thomas et al., supra note
165, at 981 (finding that 50% of CEO employment contracts during a ten-year period
contained arbitration clauses).
238.
See Bishara et al., supra note 237, at 12.
239.
Id. at 45 n.174.
240.
See Employment Agreement Between W. Univ. Bd. of Trustees and Dr. John
M. Dunn, art. 8 (Dec. 17, 2012) (on file with author).
241.
See Employment Agreement Between Univ. of Mich. and Dr. Mark S.
Schlissel §12 (Jan. 24, 2014) (on file with author).
242.
Thomas & Van Horn, supra note 50, at 238.
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disputes.2 43 In our samples, arbitration provisions appear in only a minority of these
top employees' agreements, 2"
although they are more common than
noncompetition clauses. For example, there are 26 college president contracts that
contain arbitration provisions. Football coaches are more likely to have arbitration
provisions: we found such provisions in 11.4% of football coach contracts."
Placing mandatory arbitration provisions in football coach contracts has been
suggested in order to avoid the "spotlight of a courtroom," as quarrels between
football coaches and their schools are media-worthy events.2 6 However, according
to our research, this advice has not gained in popularity.
CONCLUSION
University football coaches and college presidents are highly paid
executives. In this Article, we argue that they are highly skilled individuals who
have great responsibility for their programs and universities, and that given
competitive labor markets, there is little reason to believe that their level of
compensation is inefficient. In support of our position, we analyzed their
compensation packages and written employment contracts and compared them over
a wide variety of characteristics. Our observations are generally consistent with
economic theory.
We find several noteworthy results. First, football coaches have much
shorter tenure than college presidents, which has significant implications for the
structure of their contracts. For example, football coaches have a greater need for
protection against termination without cause and as a result, have more frequent and
larger severance pay provisions in their contracts.
Second, football coach pay has been rising much more quickly over recent
years, especially at larger schools in the Power Five Conferences, in large part
because of the explosion in television and bowl revenues for these football
programs. Given the lucrative nature of college football, especially when the
school's program is successful, there is a high degree of competition to attract the
best coaches, and compensation levels have risen accordingly.
Third, college presidents' compensation is higher at larger schools and at
the Power Five Conference schools, but the differences are much less dramatic. The
243.
Id. at 239.
244.
Recent litigation filed by former USC coach Steve Sarkisian against his former
employer relating to the grounds for his termination may be sent to arbitration under the terms
of his employment contract. Chip Patterson, USC Responds to Steve Sarkisian's Wrongful
Termination
Lawsuit,
CBS
SPORTS
(Jan.
9,
2016),
http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/eye-on-college-football/25443385/usc-respondsto-steve-sarkisian-wrongful-termination-lawsuit-contests-alcoholism.
245.
Thomas & Van Horn, supra note 50, at 238; see also Brent C. Moberg,
Navigating the Public Relations Minefield: Mutual Protection Through Mandatory
Arbitration Clauses in College Coaching Contracts, 16 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 85 passim
(2006) (arguing that college football coaches should routinely include arbitration provisions).
246.
Brent C. Moberg, Navigating the Public Relations Minefield: Mutual
Protection Through Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in College Coaching Contracts, 16 J.
LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 85, 86 (2006). The authors also suggest pairing a mandatory
alternative dispute resolution clause with a confidentiality provision. Id. at 88.
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relative difficulty in determining the metrics for measuring presidents' success and
the lack of a major new source of revenue like television both seem to explain the
relatively slow growth of college president pay.
Both sets of top university executives receive perquisites as part of their
compensation, most of which are closely aligned with their ability to perform well
in their positions. College presidents, for instance, are expected to entertain alumni
regularly, and therefore are often provided with a suitable home by their school for
doing so. Coaches, on the other hand, spend a lot of their time on the road recruiting
high school athletes to come to their school, and are thus given cars and sometimes
access to the university's plane.
Finally, turning to the legal terms of the employment contracts, we find that
football coach contracts have much more specific terms than those of college
presidents. In particular, we show that football coach contracts are more likely to
include a fixed term of years for their employment, carefully written for-causetermination provisions, and substantial amounts of severance pay if they are
terminated without cause. Each of these attributes is consistent with the differences
arising from employment for the two types of employees with their home school.
We also find that neither set of contracts makes significant use of arbitration or
noncompetition clauses.

